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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 1989, the United States Supreme Court announced its
decision in Texas v. Johnson1 invalidating the conviction under Texas'
flag-desecration statute of a political protester who had burned the
American flag to denounce the capitalist policies of a republican presi-
dent and his party. The Supreme Court's decision triggered a sequence
of political activity that has resulted in a proposed amendment to the
United States Constitution, and a revision to the federal flag-desecration
statute.3
This Article compares the holding of Texas v. Johnson with prior
flag-desecration decisions issued by the Supreme Court. This Article also
comments on the newly-amended federal desecration statute and con-
cludes that it is unlikely to pass constitutional muster. Further, the Arti-
cle argues that the proposed constitutional amendment may allow state
and federal prosecutors the discretion to prosecute only those who dese-
crate the flag with unpopular political motivations.
Part II of this Article analyzes the Supreme Court case law on flag
desecration, and specifically focuses on the holding in Texas v. Johnson.
The Supreme Court precedents suggest that a statute outlawing desecra-
tion of the flag would be held constitutional provided that criminal liabil-
ity does not turn on communicative aspects of the desecration.
4
Although the Court has shown a marked unwillingness to strike down
desecration statutes on their face, it has repeatedly held that those stat-
utes were unconstitutionally applied.5
Part III of this Article analyzes the recent amendment to the federal
flag-desecration statute. Although the statute was revised in order to
avoid constitutional challenges, and to render a constitutional amend-
ment unnecessary,6 this Article concludes that it has failed to achieve
either goal. Furthermore, on its face the Flag Code outlaws many com-
mon uses of the flag,7 and unless the revised statute is neutrally applied
to prosecute such violations without regard to political content, its appli-
cation could be held unconstitutional under Texas v. Johnson.8 However,
1. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
2. Id. at 2536.
3. See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
4. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974);
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). See also infra notes 26-73 and accompanying text.
5. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974);
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). See also infra notes 26-73 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
8. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
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because the new statute has replaced the clarity of the prior law with an
ambiguous definition of "flag," 9 neutral application may prove impossi-
ble. We may expect prosecutions under the new statutory provision to
run afoul of the Constitution.
Part IV of this Article analyzes and comments upon the President's
proposed constitutional amendment.10 On its face, the amendment adds
nothing to the legislatures' power, but merely restates what the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged in Texas v. Johnson: Congress and
the states have an interest in prohibiting desecration of the flag.l" The
proposed amendment does not even hint that it is intended to overturn
Texas v. Johnson or to repeal the first amendment's restriction on dese-
cration prosecutions. If the amendment's proponents intend to change
the law, the proposed text should reflect that intent.
If the proposed amendment is adopted, its reach will be as broad as
its terms. The proposed amendment concerns "physical desecration of
the flag of the United States."12 Part V of this Article analyzes the mean-
ing of these words. The words "flag of the United States" include any
recognizable representation of the flag.13 The term "desecration" is de-
fined as improper treatment of a holy object-in this instance the flag.14
The words "physical desecration" refer to any nonverbal conduct rela-
tive to the flag that is improper in light of its status.15 The rules of
proper conduct are detailed and well defined.1 6
Part V of this Article suggests that the President desires to amend
the Constitution in order to permit selective, politically motivated prose-
cutions. Desecration, as defined above, is commonplace-representa-
tions of the flag are used on postage stamps and in advertisements.
Therefore, the amendment's proponents surely do not intend to eliminate
all desecration through criminal prosecutions. Thus, the author believes
9. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1982) with Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).
10. See H.R.J. Res. 350, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. E2247 (1989).
11. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547. ("We reject the suggestion... that the Government lacks
'any state interest whatsoever' in regulating the manner in which the flag may be displayed.")
12. H.R.J. Res. 350, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. E2447 (1989). See also Bush
Predicts Ban on Flag Desecration, L.A. Daily J., July 3, 1989, § I, at 4, col. 2; Bush Vows to
Enforce Civil Rights Laws, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1989, at Z7, col. 1.
13. See infra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.
14. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 610 (4th ed. 1976). "To vio-
late the sanctity of by diverting from sacred purpose, by contaminating, or by defiling. To
divest of sacred character or treat as unhallowed."
15. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 603-04 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("The flag of the United States is not just another 'thing,'... [it is] a unique national symbol
which has been given content by generations ... .
16. See 36 U.S.C. §§ 173-78 (1982).
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that the proposed amendment can only be designed to abolish the first
amendment doctrines prohibiting selective prosecution motivated by
political considerations.17 The Article predicts that if the proposed
amendment achieves this goal, it will enable federal or local government
prosecutors to use desecration laws to jail political dissidents and reli-
gious minorities disapproved of by prosecuting authorities.
Part VI of the Article focuses on the situation of individuals who
refuse to salute the flag for religious reasons. These individuals commit
"physical desecration" of the flag in its strictest, purest sense because by
their conduct they treat the flag as unholy or profane. Jehovah's Wit-
nesses faced legal persecution until the United States Supreme Court held
their conduct was protected by the first amendment.18 In his campaign
for the Presidency, Vice President Bush attacked Michael S. Dukakis for
honoring judicial precedents prohibiting forced flag salutes.19 Now the
President proposes amending the Constitution to remove the first amend-
ment's prohibitions to prosecution for flag desecration. As a result, Jeho-
vah's Witnesses could be among the first victims under the President's
amendment.
Part VII argues that despite the language of the proposed amend-
ment, it apparently would not stop flag burning as a political protest.
Proper respect for the flag requires that it be burned when it is no longer
fit for display.20 Under the proposed amendment, anyone capable of
reading the Flag Code2' could successfully denounce and burn the flag
with impunity.
Part VIII of this Article notes that the Constitution may limit both
the substance of amendments and the procedure by which they may be
adopted. The Article argues that if the proposed amendment is intended
to overturn the Johnson Court's holding, it amounts to a partial repeal of
the first amendment, thus abridging its protections for flag desecrators.
Further, the Article argues that the first and fourteenth amendments de-
prive both Congress and the states of power to pass any law abridging the
freedom of speech.22 Thus, an amendment limiting free speech may be
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also infra notes
283-92 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 293-97.
20. 36 U.S.C. § 176(k) (1982).
21. 36 U.S.C. §§ 172-78 (1982).
22. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. The first amendment provides in relevant part, "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Id. amend. I. This language
has been made applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943).
[Vol. 23:535
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proposed and adopted only by United States citizens in a constitutional
convention.
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE FLAG
The United States Supreme Court has had several occasions to re-
view cases involving flag-desecration statutes but has never held that
Congress or the states may not prohibit non-verbal desecration of the
flag. The Court has held statutes unconstitutional because they compel
utterances of respect for the flag,23 punish spoken words of disrespect, 24
or are void for vagueness.2"
The Court has also invalidated convictions under desecration stat-
utes on first amendment grounds without invalidating the statutes them-
selves by concluding only that the statutes involved were
unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.26 Texas v. Johnson27 is the
most recent of these opinions. The Supreme Court has been notably un-
willing to invalidate on its face or on first amendment grounds any dese-
cration statute which punishes non-verbal desecration of the flag. 28 In all
23. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("the flag
salute is a form of utterance" that may not be compelled).
24. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). In Street, the Court held that Street's
conviction for desecration of the flag could not stand because it might have been based in part
upon his spoken words. Id. at 590-94. The Court remanded for Street to be tried again for his
physical actions desecrating the flag. Id. at 594; see also People v. Street, 24 N.Y.2d 1028, 302
N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (1969) (on remand, New York Court of Appeals ordered defendant to be
re-tried solely for his act of burning flag).
25. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
26. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2538 n.3 (1989) ("Although Johnson has raised
a facial challenge to Texas' flag-desecration statute, we choose to resolve this case on the basis
of his claim that the statute as applied to him violates the First Amendment."); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.9 (1974) ("[A]s applied to appellant's activity the Washing-
ton statute impermissibly infringed protected expression; because we agree with appellant's as-
applied argument, we do not reach the more comprehensive overbreadth contention he also
advances.").
27. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
28. Statutory and Constitutional Responses to the Supreme Court Decision in Texas v. John-
son: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary
Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989) (testimony of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe), reprinted in
Should a ConstitutionalAmendment to Prevent Flag Desecration Be Approved?, 68 CONG. DIG.
202, 219-21 (1989) [hereinafter CONG. DIG.]. Professor Tribe testified:
Those who suggest that even a law appropriately drawn along.., neutral lines might
be struck down by the same Supreme Court majority that reversed Gregory Lee
Johnson's conviction have, in my view, misread what that majority had to say. Just
as Chief Justice Warren and Justices Hugo Black and Abe Fortas expressed their
view twenty years ago that a properly drawn prohibition on flag-burning would not
violate the Constitution, so I am convinced that at least some of the Justices in the
five-to-four Texas v. Johnson majority would agree with this conclusion, and that
those Justices, joined by the four dissenters, would represent a clear majority to up-
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likelihood, a majority of the Court would uphold the validity of criminal
provisions punishing desecration of the flag, if they are not directed to-
ward punishing political messages.29 Convictions under such a statute
probably would be upheld, provided that it is neutrally applied so that
decisions to prosecute are not motivated by ideological considerations.
A powerful argument can be made that desecration statutes neces-
sarily violate the first amendment. The primary rationale behind statutes
punishing desecration of the flag is that the flag is a special symbol which
merits respectful treatment. 30 For instance, Chief Justice Rehnquist has
argued that the flag is a "unique symbol" warranting special protec-
tion.31 However, this contention proves too much. The flag is a "unique
symbol" because it represents and communicates a set of ideas that can-
not be as effectively represented or communicated in any other way. An
effort to regulate the flag's symbolism is necessarily an effort to regulate
communication, for the flag is a symbol only because of what it repre-
sents and communicates to those who view it. Additionally, its very uni-
queness means that statements made by, or with, the flag cannot be made
as effectively in any other way.32 Arguably, legislation prohibiting dese-
cration of the flag is directed at expressive conduct with the purpose of
prohibiting certain disapproved expressions As such, it cannot easily
survive the first amendment's prohibition of laws to abridge the freedom
of speech.33
However, the Supreme Court will not likely embrace such an argu-
ment. The Court has long recognized a legitimate state interest in pre-
serving the physical integrity of the flag, and it has repeatedly declined to
hold a properly drawn law-one making it a crime wilfully to destroy, or substan-
tially mutilate, or trample upon, any American flag.
Id.
29. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546-47.
30. See, e.g., Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
31. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("For more than 200
years, the American flag has occupied a unique position as the symbol of our Nation, a unique-
ness that justifies a governmental prohibition against flag burning in the way respondent John-
son did here."); Spence, 418 U.S. at 423 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (state may withdraw flag as
"a unique national symbol from roster of materials that may be used as background for com-
munications"); Goguen, 415 U.S. at 603-04 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.)
("The flag of the United States is not just another 'thing,' and it is not just another 'idea'; it is
not primarily an idea at all .... [It is] a unique national symbol which has been given content
by generations ....").
32. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546 n. 11 (noting "the dissent's quite correct reminder that the
flag occupies a unique position in our society-which demonstrates that messages conveyed
without use of the flag are not 'just as forcefu[l]' as those conveyed with it. .. ").
33. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1502-03 (1975).
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invalidate desecration statutes on first amendment grounds.34 As dis-
cussed below, these opinions suggest that the Court regards such statutes
as a legitimate exercise of state power if they are applied consistently and
without improper prosecutorial discrimination.35 The central lessons
taught by the Supreme Court precedents are that Congress and the states
do have the power to prohibit desecration of the flag, but that this power
may not be used to punish the expressive elements of conduct. 36
A. Historical Overview
1. Halter v. Nebraska establishes the power to outlaw desecration
The leading Supreme Court opinion establishing that government
has a legitimate interest in compelling respectful treatment of the flag is
Halter v. Nebraska,37 which was decided in 1907. In Halter, businessmen
had violated Nebraska's flag desecration statute when they had "unlaw-
fully exposed to public view, sold, exposed for sale, and had in their pos-
session for sale a bottle of beer upon which, for purposes of
advertisement, was printed and painted a representation of the flag of the
United States."'3 1 When the businessmen challenged their convictions for
desecration of the flag, the Court refused "to hold that the statute of
Nebraska, in forbidding use of the flag of the United States for purposes
of mere advertisement, infringes any right protected by the Constitution
of the United States."'39 The Court held, to the contrary, that "no one
can be said to have the right, secured by the Constitution, to use the
country's flag merely for purposes of advertising articles of merchan-
dise."' The Halter holding is a ringing endorsement of governmental
power to prohibit desecration of the flag of the United States:
One who loves the Union will love the state in which he resides,
and love both of the common country and of the state will di-
minish in proportion as respect for the flag is weakened. There-
fore a state will be wanting in care for the well-being of its
people if it ignores the fact that they regard the flag as a symbol
of their country's power and prestige, and will be impatient if
any open disrespect is shown towards it. By the statute in ques-
34. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 37-73 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 37-90 and accompanying text.
37. 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
38. Id. at 38. It is, of course, a desecration of the flag to use it for advertising. See 36
U.S.C. § 176(h) (1988 Supp.) ("The flag should never be used for advertising in any manner
whatsoever"); see infra notes 212-25 and accompanying text.
39. Halter, 205 U.S. at 41.
40. Id. at 45.
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tion the state has in substance declared that no one subject to
its jurisdiction shall use the flag for purposes of trade and traf-
fic,-a purpose wholly foreign to that for which it was provided
by the nation. Such a use tends to degrade and cheapen the flag
in the estimation of the people, as well as to defeat the object of
maintaining it as an emblem of national power and national
honor. And we cannot hold that any privilege of American cit-
izenship or that any right of personal liberty is violated by a
state enactment forbidding the flag to be used as an advertise-
ment on a bottle of beer. It is familiar law that even the privi-
leges of citizenship and the rights inhering in personal liberty
are subject, in their enjoyment, to such reasonable restraints as
may be required for the general good.4'
Although the Court has subsequently noted that Halter was decided
before the Court explicitly held that the first amendment applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause, it has
taken pains not to overrule the opinion.42
2. First amendment limitations on the power to prohibit desecration
Subsequent opinions indicate that Halter's power to prohibit dese-
cration of the flag is a license neither to regulate communicative expres-
sion as such, nor to persecute political dissidents on the pretext of
compelling proper treatment of the flag. The Supreme Court's holdings
up to, and including, Texas v. Johnson,43 impose limitations on exercise
of the power to prohibit desecration of the flag, but do not abrogate or
even question the existence of that power itself. The central theme of
these opinions is that the power to compel respectful conduct toward the
flag cannot be used as a pretext to regulate expressive communication.
In Minersville School District v. Gobitis," the Court upheld West
Virginia laws used to punish Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to salute
the flag.45 In his dissent Justice Stone noted that the law was used
against a "small and helpless minority."'46 The majority nonetheless re-
jected arguments based on the free speech and the free exercise of reli-
41. Id. at 42-43.
42. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2545 n.10 ("Our decision in Halter v. Nebraska is
not to the contrary .... we continually emphasized in Halter itself that case involves purely
commercial rather than political speech.").
43. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
44. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
45. Id. at 599-600.
46. Id. at 606 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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gion clauses of the first amendment.47 The decision in Gobitis briefly
stood for the proposition that the government could compel verbal ex-
pressions of respect for the flag. However, the Court overruled Gobitis
three years later in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,4"
holding that although school boards are "numerous and their territorial
jurisdiction often small," even "village tyrants" are not beyond the reach
of the first amendment.49 The Court's ruling made clear that although
laws promoting patriotism or the flag salute are not unconstitutional,
they may not be used to compel religious or ideological minorities to
pledge allegiance to the flag.50 In concurrence, Justices Black and Doug-
las observed that the flag salute, "when enforced against conscientious
objectors, [is] more likely to defeat than to serve its high purpose, [and] is
a handy implement for disguised religious persecution. As such it is in-
consistent with our Constitution's plan and purpose.
51
Twenty-six years later, in Street v. New York,52 the United States
Supreme Court invalidated the conviction of Sidney Street for violating a
New York desecration law that made it a crime to "'publicly mutilate,
deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon [the flag]
either by words or act.' ,51 Street was charged with:
the crime of Malicious Mischief in that [he] did wilfully and
unlawfully defile, cast contempt upon and burn an American
Flag, in violation of [New York's desecration statute], under
the following circumstances: ... [he] did wilfully and unlaw-
fully set fire to an American Flag and shout, 'If they did that to
Meredith, We [sic] don't need an American Flag.'54
Street had been "charged with two acts violative of the statute: burning a
flag and publicly speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the
47. Id. at 594-95.
48. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
49. Id. at 637-38.
50. Id. at 642. The Court stated that:
if there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion ....
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intel-
lect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
51. Id. at 644 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
52. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
53. Id. at 578 (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1425, subd. 16(d) (McKin-
ney 1909) (current version at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 136(d) (McKinney 1988)).
54. Id. at 579 (quoting sworn information). Street had "heard a news report that civil
rights leader James Meredith had been shot by a sniper in Mississippi." Id. at 578.
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flag."55 As a consequence, his words might have been a basis for his con-
viction. The Court wrote:
when a single-count indictment or information charges the
commission of a crime by virtue of the defendant's having done
both a constitutionally protected act and one which may be un-
protected, and a guilty verdict ensues without elucidation, there
is an unacceptable danger that the trier of fact will have re-
garded the two acts as 'intertwined' and have rested the convic-
tion on both together. 6
Thus, the Court held, "even assuming that the record precludes the infer-
ence that appellant's conviction might have been based solely on his
words, we are still bound to reverse if the conviction could have been
based upon both his words and his act."57 Although the Court purported
to avoid the question,58 the disposition of the case suggested that a con-
viction based solely upon physical desecration of the flag may be constitu-
tionally permissible if it is unaffected by communicative statements.
Even so, a conviction that might have turned on the communicative as-
pect of Street's protest could not stand. 9 Although the defendant had
physically desecrated the flag, his conviction was overturned because it
may have been based in part on mere words.60
Barnette and Street seem to stand for the proposition that the gov-
ernment may not regulate communicative expression regarding the flag,
either by compelling utterances of respect for the flag, or by prohibiting
expressions of disrespect. In each, the Court's analysis focused on statu-
tory provisions that violated the Constitution. However, the Constitu-
tion's limitations apply not just to the legislature's lawmaking powers in
a narrow sense, but also to how the law is applied by those who interpret
and enforce it.
61
In 1974, the Court again reached first amendment issues in Spence v.
55. Id. at 588.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 587. Even after the Supreme Court's decision in Street, some courts have still
focused attention on verbal utterances of defendants in desecration cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 98 (9th Cir. 1972) (sustaining conviction of defendant who
"uttered a very unladylike expression, threw the flag on the floor.., sprayed it with fluid from
a yellow can," and ignited it).
58. Street, 394 U.S. at 587.
59. Id. at 594 ("[We are unable to sustain a conviction that may have rested on a form of
expression.").
60. Id. at 589-90.
61. As early as 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court invalidated a San Fran-
cisco ordinance because of discriminatory application against a racial minority. 118 U.S. 356,
373-74 (1886).
[Vol. 23:535
BURNING THE FLAG
Washington. 2 The Court invalidated a Washington state conviction for
taping a peace symbol on the flag and displaying it publicly.63 The Court
concluded that Spence had displayed the flag to express his political
views and that the case was one of "prosecution for the expression of an
idea through activity."'  As such, the Court held the prosecution
unconstitutional.65
The Spence decision could be construed as holding that desecration
of the flag is constitutionally protected whenever it is done to express a
political belief.66 Yet the Court's qualifications of its holding leave con-
siderable doubt as to its meaning. It emphasized that the flag was not
permanently damaged,67 that it was private property,68 that the convic-
tion was under an "improper use" statute rather than a "desecration stat-
ute,' 69 and stated that "[g]iven the protected character of [the]
expression and in light of the fact that no interest the State may have in
preserving the physical integrity of a privately owned flag was signifi-
cantly impaired on these facts, the conviction must be invalidated."
70
What is clear is that the state conceded that the appellant engaged in a
form of communication. 71 The Court concluded that this was "a case of
prosecution for the expression of an idea through activity."' 72 The Court
invalidated the conviction but allowed the Washington statute to stand.73
Spence thus seems to stand only for the principal that a valid statute may
not be used in order to punish expression.
3. Due process challenges to state flag-desecration statutes
In Smith v. Goguen,74 the United States Supreme Court invalidated
Valerie Goguen's conviction under the Massachusetts desecration law
62. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
63. Id. at 415.
64. Id. at 411.
65. Id. at 414-15.
66. Ely, supra note 33, at 1482. Professor Ely has noted that "the Supreme Court, on one
narrow ground or another, has avoided definitively ruling on the constitutionality of convic-
tions for politically inspired destruction or alteration of the American flag. The most recent
decision, Spence v. Washington, does seem to approach such a ruling, at least if one ignores the
various irrelevancies with which the Court hedged its opinion." Id. (footnotes omitted).
67. Spence, 418 U.S. at 415.
68. Id. at 409.
69. Id. at 406-07, 415.
70. Id. at 415. There is no distinction between desecration and improper use; improper
use is desecration by definition. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
71. Id. at 409.
72. Id. at 411.
73. Id. at 406.
74. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
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because that law's vagueness invited discriminatory prosecution. 75 The
Massachusetts statute made it criminal to "treat contemptuously the flag
of the United States."7 6 Goguen was convicted for wearing the flag sewn
to the seat of his pants.77 The Court recognized that "careless uses of the
flag" such as this "constitute unceremonial treatment that many people
view as contemptuous. ' 78 Still, the Court held Goguen's conviction un-
lawful because of the potential for discriminatory prosecution. 9 The
Court stated:
Statutory language of such a standardless sweep allows police-
men, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilec-
tions. Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for
setting the standards of the criminal law. In Gregory v. City of
Chicago, Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, voiced a
concern, which we share, against entrusting lawmaking "to the
moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat."
The aptness of his admonition is evident from appellant's can-
did concession during oral argument before the Court of Ap-
peals regarding state enforcement standards for that portion of
the statute under which Goguen was convicted:
"[A]s counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war protester
who, while attending a rally at which it begins to rain, evi-
dences his disrespect for the American flag by contemptuously
covering himself with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be
prosecuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a member of
the American Legion who, caught in the same rainstorm while
returning from an 'America-Love It or Leave It' rally, simi-
larly uses the flag, but does so regrettably and without a con-
temptuous attitude, would not be prosecuted."
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process.80
The Court did not reach the first amendment issue of whether
75. Id. at 567-68. The First Circuit held the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional on
grounds of both vagueness and overbreadth. Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 96, 105 (1st Cir.
1972), aff'd, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground of vagueness
alone, declining to "reach the correctness of the holding below or other First Amendment
grounds." Goguen, 415 U.S. at 567-68.
76. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 568-70 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 5 (West 1970
& Supp. 1973)).
77. Id. at 568.
78. Id. at 574.
79. Id. at 575-76.
80. Id. at 576 (quoting Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 102 (1972), aff'd, 415 U.S. 566
(1974)) (footnotes omitted).
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Goguen was in fact prosecuted for the communicative content of his
act.8" The potential for discriminatory prosecution led the Court to hold
that the statute was void for vagueness as it applied to Goguen.82 The
Court held that "insofar as the vagueness doctrine is concerned, [the con-
stitutionality of desecration statutes] will depend as much on their judi-
cial construction and enforcement history as their literal terms." 3 The
Court did not foreclose even-handed enforcement of clearly written dese-
cration laws.84 Indeed, if the Massachusetts law was used to punish all
unceremonial uses of the flag, including those reluctantly committed by
rain-afflicted Legionnaires, the statute would have withstood the Court's
vagueness analysis. The statute was unconstitutionally vague because it
was impossible to tell which unceremonial uses would be punished, and
which would not be punished.
In 1974 the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Second Circuit's
opinion in Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Committee v. Cahn." Cahn
prohibited prosecution under New York's desecration statute of anyone
displaying a button or decal featuring a peace sign against a circular
background of stars and stripes.86 The Second Circuit agreed with the
district court's assertion that the construction placed on the New York
law
"would make criminal the possession of all those reproductions
of the face of President John F. Kennedy superimposed upon a
picture of the American flag which hang on the walls of shops,
homes and offices all over the country. And what of the mil-
lions of celluloid campaign buttons which for generations, in-
cluding the time before this statute was enacted, have carried
the photographs of the aspiring Presidential and other candi-
dates against a background of one or more American flags in
full color?"
8 7
The court found that the state law could not "reasonably be interpreted
to be inapplicable to the emblem in question."8 However, since it
"vest[ed] local law enforcement officers with too much arbitrary discre-
81. Id. at 568.
82. Id. at 578.
83. Id. at 582 n.31. See also State v. Royal, 113 N.H. 224, 305 A.2d 676 (1973).
84. Id. at 578. The Court stated that "a legislature should define with some care the flag
behavior it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legislature from defining with sub-
stantive specificity what constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags." Id. at 581-82.
85. 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
86. Id. at 346.
87. Id. at 348 (quoting Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 322 F. Supp.
559, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)).
88. Id. at 347.
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tion in determining whether or not a certain emblem is grounds for pro-
tection,"89 the statute was found to be overbroad, and therefore,
unconstitutional. 90
B. Texas v. Johnson
Texas v. Johnson 91 is best understood as a case involving discrimina-
tory prosecution. Johnson had "raised a facial challenge to Texas' flag-
desecration statute," and asked the United States Supreme Court to
strike the statute down as void on its face under the first amendment.
92
The Court refused.9 3 Instead, the Court held that although valid convic-
tions might be had against those who desecrate the flag, Texas had vio-
lated the first amendment by improperly using its desecration statute to
punish Johnson for communicating unpopular political beliefs. 94
The Johnson Court acknowledged that "Johnson was convicted of
flag desecration for burning the flag rather than for uttering insulting
words."9" However, the Court concluded that he was prosecuted be-
cause of the expressive content of his act. 96 This factor was central to the
Court's analysis. 97 The Court stated:
If the State's regulation is not related to expression, then the
less stringent standard we announced in United States v.
O'Brien for regulations of noncommunicative conduct controls.
If it is, then we are outside of [the] O'Brien test, and we must
ask whether this interest justifies Johnson's conviction under a
more demanding standard ....
[A]lthough we have recognized that where "'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms," ... we have limited the applicability of
O'Brien's relatively lenient standard to those cases in which
89. Id. at 350.
90. Id.
91. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
92. Id. at 2538 n.3.
93. Id. at 2538-39 n.3.
94. Id. at 2538 n.3. The flag burning occurred during a demonstration against the Reagan
administration. Id. at 2536. Literature was distributed by protesters denouncing administra-
tion policies and the policies of some Dallas corporations. Id.
95. Id. at 2538.
96. Id. at 2542-43.
97. Id.
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"the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression." . . . [W]e have highlighted the requirement
that the governmental interest in question be unconnected to
expression in order to come under O'Brien's less demanding
rule.98
The Court emphasized that the Texas statute does not necessarily
apply "only to expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment." 99
As a consequence, the regulation of expressive conduct, so central to the
98. Id. at 2538, 2540-41 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968))
(citations omitted). In United States v. O'Brien the Court upheld a federal statute punishing
those who burn their draft cards, publicly or privately. 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968). The Court's
opinion established a special level of scrutiny, lower than the so-called "strict scrutiny," for
facially neutral governmental regulations that may have an incidental impact on communica-
tive conduct. The Court wrote:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377. The third factor is the crucial threshold factor that determines whether O'Brien
applies.
A number of opinions have applied O'Brien's less stringent standard in desecration cases,
and thus upheld the conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 100-02 (9th
Cir.) (statute prohibiting burning of flag does not interfere with free speech or restrict first
amendment freedoms which are not outweighed by national interest), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
106 (1972); Sutherland v. DeWulf, 323 F. Supp. 740, 744-46 (S.D. Ill. 1971) (state statute
proscribing mutilation of flag was constitutional under first and fourteenth amendments in
view of overriding state interest in preserving public peace and flag as symbol of unity); United
States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. 1111, 1113-14 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (burning of flag could not be
considered speech merely because burning was intended to express idea; statute prohibiting
burning held valid); People v. Sutherland, 9 Ill. App. 3d 824, 826-27, 292 N.E.2d 746, 748-49
(1973) (state interest in preservation of peace and public order is important, as are substantial
governmental interests unrelated to suppression of speech, therefore statute prohibiting mutila-
tion of flag is constitutional); State v. Waterman, 190 N.W.2d 809, 810 (Iowa 1971) (state may
legitimately punish desecration of flag without running afoul of first amendment protections);
State v. Royal, 113 N.H. 224, 229, 305 A.2d 676, 680 (1973) (since "state has an interest in
protecting the physical integrity of the flag, in promoting patriotism ... and pride in country"
and maintaining peace, statute prohibiting mutilation of flag was held to be constitutional);
State v. Saulino, 29 Ohio Misc. 25, 29-30, 277 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1971) (one may
say anything about the flag, but statute prohibiting contemptuous desecration of flag affects
conduct only and is constitutional).
99. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2538 n.3 (emphasis in original). The Court wrote:
A tired person might, for example, drag a flag through the mud, knowing that this
conduct is likely to offend others, and yet have no thought of expressing any idea;
neither the language nor the Texas courts' interpretations of the statute precludes the
possibility that such a person would be prosecuted for flag desecration. Because the
prosecution of a person who had not engaged in expressive conduct would pose a
different case, and because we are capable of disposing of this case on narrower
grounds, we address only Johnson's claim that § 42.09 as applied to political expres-
sion like his violates the First Amendment.
Id. at 2538-39 n.3.
January 1990]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Court's analysis, may not be found in the statute itself.c" Johnson's
prosecution was based on the communicative content of his act; the state
selectively prosecuted Johnson for reasons related to expression. 101 By
the state's own admission, "Johnson was prosecuted because he knew
that his politically charged expression would cause 'serious offense.' "102
The Court concluded that "Johnson's political expression was restricted
because of the content of the message he conveyed." ' 3 The Court ad-
monished that government may not "proscribe particular conduct be-
cause it has expressive elements."" 4 The Court continued:
[W]hat might be termed the more generalized guarantee of free-
dom of expression makes the communicative nature of conduct
an inadequate basis for singling out that conduct for proscrip-
tion. A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct
must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justifiedby the sub-
stantial showing of need that the First Amendment requires. 105
The Court did not strike down the Texas statute, but reversed John-
son's conviction because "the statute as applied to him violate[d] the First
Amendment."106 The Court thus upheld the notion that one convicted
under a valid statute may obtain a reversal of his or her conviction, if
prosecution was motivated by improper factors such as race, religion, or
political viewpoint.107 Johnson's conviction was invalidated, not the
Texas statute, because Johnson "was prosecuted for his expression of dis-
satisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situated at the
100. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1974) (amended 1989).
§ 42.09 Desecration of Venerated Object
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or otherwise
physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more
persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Id.
101. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543. The Court observed that the state's asserted interest in
condemning Johnson to preserve the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity was
"related to expression in the case of Johnson's burning of the flag." Id. at 2542.
102. Id. at 2543.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2540.
105. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703
F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)).
106. Id. at 2538 n.3 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 2539. See also United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972).
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core of our First Amendment values."' 0'
In Johnson, the Court recognized and carefully preserved the gov-
ernment's power to enforce desecration laws. It declined to overrule
Halter v. Nebraska,' 9 which upheld criminal convictions of businessmen
who desecrated the flag by using it for advertising purposes." 0 The
Johnson Court said, "as we continually emphasized in Halter itself, that
case involved commercial rather than political speech.""' The defend-
ants in Halter were punished under a statute forbidding the commercial
use of the flag, and were not prosecuted for the expression of unpopular
political ideas." 2
The popular press, however, reacted to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion by erroneously announcing that it had held desecration statutes to be
unconstitutional."' Certainly, portions of the Court's opinion could be
construed to cast doubt on the constitutionality of the Texas statute. An
element to be proved under the Texas statute was that the defendant
mistreats the flag in a way that he "knows will seriously offend one or
more persons likely to observe or discover his action.""' 4 However, the
Court did not hold that this provision of the statute was unconstitutional;
it objected to the state's application of the statute which required proof of
conduct that "is intentionally designed to seriously offend other individu-
als.""' 5 By requiring proof of an intent to affect an audience, Texas au-
thorities applied the statute in an unconstitutional fashion: "Whether
Johnson's treatment of the flag violated Texas law thus depended on the
likely communicative impact of his expressive conduct.""' 6 The Court
recognized that the statute itself did not require such an application.' 17
A holding that expressive intent cannot be an element in the prosecution
for desecration should have little impact on flag desecration laws gener-
ally, since intent is not an element of the crime."'
108. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
109. 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
110. Id. at 41.
111. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2545 n.10 (citing Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907)).
112. Id. at 2546-47.
113. See, e.g., Isaacson, O'er the Land of the Free, TIME, July 3, 1989, at 14-15. ("The
ruling does, however, invalidate laws in 48 states ... and at the federal level that prohibit the
desecration of the flag.").
114. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(b) (Vernon 1989).
115. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2538 n.3.
118. State v. Hodsdon, 289 A.2d 635, 638 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972) ("The conduct prohibited
cannot be defined in terms of attitudes.") (citing Hodsdon v. Buckson, 444 F.2d 533, 534 (3d
Cir. 1971)); State v. Kool, 212 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa 1973) (specific intent to desecrate not
element); State v. Royal, 113 N.H. 224, 227, 305 A.2d 676, 679 (1973) (words "cast contempt"
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No doubt some members of the five-Justice majority in Texas v.
Johnson would have been happy to strike the Texas statute down as un-
constitutional on its face. Indeed, Justice Kennedy in his concurrence
opined that "we are presented with a clear and simple statute to be
judged against a pure command of the Constitution.""1 9 The Johnson
majority opinion's author, Justice Brennan, previously dissented from
denial of certiorari in Kime v. United States, 20 stating that the federal
desecration statute was "flagrantly unconstitutional on its face."' 12 ' Jus-
tice Brennan stated:
The Government has no aesthetic or property interest in pro-
tecting a mere aggregation of stripes and stars for its own sake;
the only basis for a governmental interest (if any) in protecting
the flag is precisely the fact that the flag has substantive mean-
ing as a political symbol. Thus, assuming that there is a legiti-
mate interest at stake, it can hardly be said to be one divorced
from politicil expression. Hence, the one governmental inter-
est suggested as support for this statute, and these convictions,
is one clearly foreclosed by both precedent and basic First
Amendment principles. 2
He further stated that even a neutral statute "that simply outlawed any
public burning or mutilation of the flag, regardless of the expressive in-
tent or nonintent of the actor" would be unconstitutional.12 3 It is per-
haps not surprising that an opinion authored by Justice Brennan would
contain hints of his view that any desecration statute is unconstitutional
on its face and in every possible application. That, however, is not the
holding of Texas v. Johnson.124
The slim five-Justice majority in Johnson included Justice Black-
mun. In Smith v. Goguen,125 Justice Blackmun's dissent concluded that
"Goguen's punishment was constitutionally permissible for harming the
physical integrity of the flag by wearing it affixed to the seat of his
pants."' 26 Justice Blackmun not only disagreed with the Goguen Court's
holding that the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutionally vague, he
in flag desecration statute refers to effect of prohibited acts, and not to intention of actor), writ
denied, 397 F. Supp. 260 (D.N.H. 1975).
119. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. 459 U.S. 949 (1982).
121. Id. at 954 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 954-55 & n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
125. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
126. Id. at 591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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concluded that the statute's provision for punishment of one who treats
the flag with contempt did not require punishment of the communicative
content, because it had been interpreted by the Massachusetts court to
prohibit conduct only, without regard to communicative content.127 Jus-
tice Blackmun wrote:
Having rejected the vagueness challenge and concluded that
Goguen was not punished for speech, the Massachusetts court,
in upholding the conviction, has necessarily limited the scope of
the statute to protecting the physical integrity of the flag. The
requisite for "treating contemptuously" was found and the
court concluded that punishment was not for speech-a com-
municative element. I, therefore, must conclude that Goguen's
punishment was constitutionally permissible .... 128
A crucial difference between Goguen and Johnson may be Justice
Blackmun's perceptions of how the statute was interpreted and applied-
a matter of prosecutorial discretion and interpretation by the courts. In
Johnson, with Justice Blackmun's vote, the Court did not hold that dese-
cration of the flag may not be punished, but rather that desecration stat-
utes may not be applied to punish the communicative elemenis of
conduct that might otherwise be more broadly proscribed." 9
III. THE NEW FEDERAL DESECRATION STATUTE
Press accounts that the United States Supreme Court had struck
down desecration statutes and held desecration itself to be constitution-
ally protected 130 were quickly followed by a political firestorm. Both
houses of Congress passed resolutions expressing dismay at the Supreme
Court's holding. 131 President George Bush jumped on the bandwagon by
calling for a constitutional amendment to remove first amendment pro-
tections for flag desecrators. 132 Republican members of Congress drafted
127. Id. at 590-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
130. Justices Topple Flag-Burning Laws, Boston Globe, June 22, 1989, at 1, col. 3; Court
OK's Flag-Burning; Sharply Divided Justices Rule It's Symbolic Free Speech, Newsday, June
22, 1989, at 3, col. 1; Court Nullifies Flag-Desecration Laws; First Amendment is Held to Pro-
tect Burnings During Political Demonstrations, Wash. Post, June 22, 1989, at Al, col. 3.
131. S. Res. 151, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S7185-89 (1989), reprinted in 68
CONG. DIG. 195 (1989) ("expressing the Senate's profound disappointment with yesterday's
Supreme Court decision allowing the burning of the American Flag."); H.R. Res. 186, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H3228-37 (1989), reprinted in CONG. DIG. 195 (1989) (ex-
pressing "profound concern").
132. See Bush Calls for Flag Burning Ban Amendment, L.A. Daily J., June 28, 1989, § 1, at
5, col. 2.
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a proposed constitutional amendment to grant a state or the federal gov-
ernment the power to jail flag-burning protesters like Johnson. 13 3 The
President's proposed amendment provides: "The Congress and the
States shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the
flag of the United States."'
' 34
In Congressional hearings on the proposed amendment, Professors
Dellinger and Tribe explained that the Court had not invalidated dese-
cration statutes generally.' 35 Professors Dellinger and Tribe suggested
that if Congress was concerned about the validity of the federal desecra-
tion statute Congress could amend it to delete any reference to communi-
cative elements that under Supreme Court precedent, cannot form the
basis of a desecration prosecution. 136 A statutory amendment was pro-
moted as an expedient alternative to the Constitutional amendment de-
manded by the President.'
37
As a result, Congress revised the existing federal flag-desecration
statute138 to provide protection that was allegedly lacking after Texas v.
Johnson.3 9 Contending that a constitutional amendment was needed to
protect the flag, and finding a statutory amendment insufficient, Presi-
dent Bush refused to sign the bill, but permitted it to become law without
133. See Bush Predicts Passage of Flag-Burning Ban, Sacramento Bee, July 1, 1989, at AI,
col. 1; Bush Vows to Enforce Civil Rights Laws, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1989, at A7, col. 1.
134. See H.R.J. Res. 350, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. E2447 (1989). On Octo-
ber 19, 1989, the President's proposed amendment came to a vote in the Senate. Senate Rejects
Flag-Burning Amendment, L.A. Times, Oct. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 3. Fifty-one senators voted
for the proposed amendment, and forty-eight voted against it. Id. Applying the usual rule
that a constitutional amendment originating in the Congress must be approved by two-thirds
of the members of each house, the vote meant that the measure was defeated. Id.
135. CONG. DIo., supra note 28, at 209-21.
136. Id.
137. Professor Dellinger testified to his belief that "the United States Supreme Court would
sustain legislation 'protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances,'" and
suggested that "such a statute would be far less harmful to basic constitutional values than an
amendment to the Constitution." See id. at 209. Professor Tribe advanced a similar view,
arguing that enforcement of such a law "need raise no First Amendment problem as long as
those who are punished are not singled out because of any message they might intend to con-
vey, or their audience might happen to receive, by their destruction or mutilation of an Ameri-
can flag." Id. at 219. He further stated that "on its 200th birthday, the Bill of Rights deserves
a better present than a needless amendment." Id. at 221.
138. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989). See also
generally Bush to Let Flag Burning Bill Become Law but Won't Sign It, L.A. Times, Oct. 14,
1989, at A20, col. 1 ("Bush proposed a constitutional amendment against flag desecration, but
Congress chose to deal with the matter through legislation."); House Votes, 380 to 38 to Outlaw
Flag Burning, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1989, at Al, col. 2 ("For their part, Democrats hope that
the passage of the statute takes the steam out of the drive for a constitutional amendment.").
139. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
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his signature.140
The previously existing federal desecration statute provided: "Who-
ever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the United States by
publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year,
or both." 14' The alleged deficiency of this statute lay in the words "casts
contempt," which could be construed to impose an element of intent to
communicate disrespect for the flag, so that any prosecutions under the
statute would run afoul of Johnson.142 Although such a construction of
the federal statute was not required, it arguably had been adopted by
some federal courts. 143 In this respect the new statutory language is an
improvement, because it reduces the likelihood that the statute unconsti-
140. Bush to Let Flag-Burning Bill Become Law but Won't Sign It, L.A. Times, Oct. 14,
1989, at A20, col. 1. As reported by the Los Angeles Times, "The President said that he will
allow the recently passed bill to become law automatically without his signature but added
that he does not think the law will withstand legal challenges." Id.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1982) (amended 1989).
142. Justice Brennan adopted such an interpretation of the federal statute in Kime v. United
States, 459 U.S. 949, 954-55 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The
trial court apparently had construed the statute otherwise, for the defendants "were forbidden
to introduce any evidence or argument at trial as to the purposes of the March 27 demonstra-
tion or as to their intent in burning a flag." Id. at 950 n.l.
On July 18, 1989, Professor Dellinger testified before the Civil and Constitutional Rights
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee:
Neither Texas nor the United States has ever enacted a statute designed simply
to protect the physical integrity of the flag. Under the existing statutes proof that a
defendant had knowingly and deliberately burned an American flag would not con-
stitute proof of a crime. Essential to a Federal prosecution would be the additional
evidence that the defendant was expressing an idea of contempt, and essential to a
Texas prosecution would be the evidence that the defendant was expressing the idea
that the flag was not sacred and that this 'desecration' was done with knowledge that
observers would be seriously offended by this message. The flaw in each statute is
that the communication of an idea is essential to the commission of the crime. The
'governmental interest' is thus directly related to the message being communicated.
Statutory and Constitutional Responses to the Supreme Court Decision in Texas v. Johnson:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary
Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989), reprinted in CONG. DIG., supra note 28, at 209.
Apparently, Professor Dellinger confused Texas' application of its statute with what the stat-
ute itself requires. See id. at 209-10.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 100 (9th Cir. 1972); Joyce v. United
States, 454 F.2d 971, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972); Hoffman v.
United States, 445 F.2d 226, 229-31 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (MacKinnon, J., concurring). In Smith
v. Goguen, Justice White concurred in the Court's judgment, not on the vagueness grounds of
the majority opinion, but because he believed the state statute's language punishing one who
"treats contemptuously" the flag unfairly implied an element of communicative intent. 415
U.S. 566, 587-88 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). He observed that "to con-
vict on this basis is to convict not to protect the physical integrity or to protect against acts
interfering with the proper use of the flag, but to punish for communicating ideas about the
flag unacceptable to the controlling majority in the legislature." Id. at 588 (White, J., concur-
ring) (footnote omitted). Justice Blackmun dissented, noting that he could not agree with
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tutionally includes expression as an element of the federal offense. The
amended statute provides: "Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces,
bums, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.""' All
references to treating the flag with "contempt" are deleted.145
The new federal statute may actually protect persons who desecrate
the flag to denounce American ideals. It provides that the federal law
"does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal of a flag when it
has become worn or soiled."' 46 The section does not require that the
method of disposal be dignified. Representative Chuck Douglas aptly
called the bill the "flag-burner protection act of 1989."' 4
However, the revisions do not guarantee that the statute will be con-
stitutionally applied by prosecuting authorities. The revised statute pro-
vides that "[a]s used in this section, the term 'flag of the United States'
means any flag of the United States, or any part thereof made of any
Justice White's conclusion "that the words 'treats contemptuously' are necessarily directed at
protected speech . . . ." Id. at 590 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
A construction of the federal statute that requires specific intent to communicate con-
tempt would depart from the usual rule, as expressed in Justice White's concurrence in
Goguen, that the desecration offense does not require a showing of specific intent to dishonor
the flag. Id. at 588-89 (White, J., concurring). As Justice White recognized in his Goguen
concurrence, the words "casts contempt" need not be interpreted to require any showing of
intent to express contempt. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 588-89 (White, J., concurring) (citing State v.
Royal, 113 N.H. 224, 305 A.2d 676 (1973)). In State v. Royal the New Hampshire Supreme
Court interpreted its state's statute, finding that "[t]he words 'cast contempt' are directed to
the effect of the prohibited acts and not at the intention of the actor." 113 N.H. 224, 227, 305
A.2d 676, 679 (1973). Indeed, desecration by definition involves treatment of a venerated
object in a fashion that is inconsistent with its revered status. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 610 (3d ed. 1966). Thus, to treat the flag improperly in any manner is to
fail to accord it the reverence which it is due, and thus to "cast contempt" whether or not
contempt is specifically intended.
144. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989). See also Text
of House's Measure to Protect the Flag, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1989, at A15, col. 1.
145. Furthermore, the previous provision that the desecration be "public" to be criminally
sanctioned has been deleted. This revision may be responsive to the Supreme Court's observa-
tion in United States v. O'Brien that a statute regulating private conduct is not directed to the
suppression of expression. 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968). The O'Brien Court upheld a federal
statute prohibiting destruction of draft cards. The Court observed that "there is nothing nec-
essarily expressive about such conduct. The [law] does not distinguish between public and pri-
vate destruction, and it does not punish only desecration engaged in for the purpose of
expressing views." Id.
Interestingly, removal of the public/private distinction in the amended federal statute
renders the federal statute substantively distinct from many state statutes which require public
desecration. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
146. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).
147. House Votes, 380 to 38 to Outlaw Flag Burning, N.Y. Times, September 13, 1989, at
Al, col. 2.
BURNING THE FLAG
substance, of any size, in a form that is commonly displayed."'48 This
definition of "flag" dramatically departs from the previous statutory defi-
nition, which limited the definition of "flag" to representations that an
"average person seeing the same without deliberation may believe the
same to represent the flag." '14 9 The former statute required that the ob-
ject desecrated at least be recognizable as a flag-the amended language
does not. A violation of the amended statute merely requires that the
object desecrated be a flag "or any part thereof" and that it be in a form
that is "commonly displayed."' 5 ° This meaning is not clear. White stars
are a part of the flag, as are red stripes. Are white stars protected from
desecration under the statute? Are red stripes? The new definition may
run afoul of the holding in Smith v. Goguen 5 that inherently vague stat-
utory language which invites discriminatory law enforcement is a denial
of due process.'52
Although the limits of the amended statute are ill-defined, several
common uses of the flag could fall within its broad prohibitions. For
example, the American flag is "commonly displayed" on postage stamps.
That these flags are small and printed on paper is not an objection, for
the statute prohibits physical desecration of flags "made of any sub-
stance, of any size, in a form that is commonly displayed."' 53 One who
affixes a flag-decorated postage stamp on an envelope to be mailed places
it there to be defaced with a postmark, and literally violates the terms of
the statute.15 4 It hardly seems likely that federal prosecutors will prose-
cute anyone who so desecrates the flag.
Even if the problem of the statute's ambiguity can be overcome, it is
likely that political considerations will be behind decisions to prosecute
only a few violators. For instance, although many state desecration stat-
utes prohibit a wide range of conduct,155 they are seldom applied unless
the desecration is associated with expression of an unpopular political
viewpoint.'
5 6
148. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989). See also Text
of House's Measure to Protect the Flag, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1989, at A15, col. 1.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 700(b) (1982) (amended 1989).
150. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989). See also Text
of House's Measure to Protect the Flag, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1989, at A15, col. 1.
151. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
152. Id. at 575-76.
153. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).
154. Id. This Article argues that use of the flag on postage stamps is a desecration of the
flag, whether or not it is criminally punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 700. See infra note 216 and
accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
156. Ely, supra note 33, at 1506 n.98 ("The legislature undoubtedly expects that the major-
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The new statute provides for expedited review by the Supreme
Court if its constitutionality under the first amendment is questioned."5 7
As a result of the statute's vague language and the probability of discrim-
inatory prosecution, the new federal statute may be held unconstitu-
tional. If Congress maintains its desire to prohibit flag desecration the
only available method will be a constitutional amendment. 58 The re-
mainder of this Article analyzes the currently proposed constitutional
amendment.
IV. INTERPRETING THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
A. The Power to Prohibit Physical Desecration as an Implicit Repeal
The proposed constitutional amendment provides: "The Congress
and the States shall have the power to prohibit physical desecration of
the flag of the United States."' 159 These words cannot reasonably be con-
strued to add anything to the Constitution, since Texas v. Johnson 6
acknowledges that the power to prohibit desecration already exists.' 61
The Court merely held that the power may not be used in ways that
violate the first amendment.' 62  The Court left absolutely intact the
power to prohibit desecration in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 6 3  If the
proposed amendment is adopted, the President may contend that it has
some meaning beyond what it says. He may earnestly argue that it was
meant to do something, however vacuous it appears. President Bush may
assert that given the context in which this amendment was proposed, it
ity of messages conveyed by disfiguring the flag-and certainly the vast majority of those that
will be prosecuted-will be unfriendly to the government or at least to one or more of its
policies.").
157. The amended statute provides:
If the question of constitutionality of this section, under the first article of amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, is properly presented in any case
before a United States district court, that court shall, if the Supreme Court of the
United States has not previously ruled on that question, immediately certify that
question to the Supreme Court.
Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989). See also Text of
House's Measure to Protect the Flag, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1989, at AI5, col. 1.
158. Robert Bork testified, "No statute can undo Texas v. Johnson." Statutory and Consti-
tutional Responses to the Supreme Court Decision in Texas v. Johnson: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1989) (testimony of Robert Bork) reprinted in 68 CONG. DIG. 193, 218 (1989).
159. H.R.J. Res. 350, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. E2247 (1989). See also Bush
Vows to Enforce Civil Rights Laws, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1989, at 27, col. 1.
160. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
161. Id. at 2540.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2546-47.
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was designed to overrule Johnson and to prohibit application of the first
amendment to any case involving "physical desecration" of the flag.
Arguments such as this should fail. The proposed amendment says
absolutely nothing about repealing the first amendment, and the Consti-
tution's words "are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense
.... ,,' Where the text's meaning is, on its face, quite clear and sim-
ple-as it is in the proposed amendment-"there is no room for con-
struction and no excuse for interpolation or addition." 165 The proposed
amendment's words are indeed stark and simple; its meaning is plain.
B. "Physical Desecration" of the Flag
Assuming the proposed amendment is redrafted to include explicit
language limiting first amendment protection, or that a repeal of the first
amendment is judicially implied, the reach of the proposed amendment
would depend on the meaning of the words: "physical desecration of the
flag of the United States." These words define the scope of the amend-
ment's operation.
Discovery of the specific meaning of these words is essential if we
are to understand the meaning of the amendment. "Flag of the United
States" refers to any flag of the United States or any part thereof that is
commonly displayed. 6 6 "Physical desecration" encompasses any con-
duct that may be deemed improper in light of the flag's special status as a
sacred symbol.1 67 This amorphous standard is not then limited to acts
which physically damage or mutilate the flag. The term also encom-
passes any non-verbal breach of etiquette in relation to the flag, whether
or not intended as an insult to the flag. "Physical desecration of the flag
of the United States" thus encompasses any physical conduct toward any
representation of the flag that falls short of the respect to which our flag
is entitled.
1. "Flag of the United States"
The flag is more than a piece of cloth. The flag of the United States
is an abstract concept, not a mere physical reality.1 68 The flag represents
our country, our Constitution, our liberty.169 Physical flags are merely
164. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
165. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931).
166. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).
167. See also infra note 183 and accompanying text.
168. See Hertzberg, Flagellation, NEW REPUBLIC, July 17 & 24, 1989, at 4.
169. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940) ("The preciousness of
the family relation, the authority and independence which give dignity to parenthood, indeed
the enjoyment of all freedom, presuppose the kind of ordered society which is summarized by
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representations of these concepts. Of course, only physical representa-
tions of our flag may be "physically desecrated" and the proposed
amendment is concerned only with conduct toward these physical repre-
sentations. Thus, for purposes of defining acceptable conduct, any repre-
sentation of the flag is to be treated as the flag. Although our flag is an
abstraction, to behold any representation of it is to stand in its reified
presence.
A federal statute directs that "[tihe flag of the United States shall be
thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white; and the union of the
flag shall be forty-eight stars, white in a blue field." 17 "On the admis-
sion of a new State into the Union one star shall be added to the union of
the flag." ' By executive order, the flag now features fifty stars.17 A
flag's material, size, or shape is not dictated by a federal statute. A presi-
dential executive order does prescribe the size and shape of "Flags manu-
factured or purchased for the use of executive agencies."' 173 Yet, none of
these characteristics define our flag, nor limit the respect to which it or
any representation of it is entitled."17
Until amended in 1989, Title 18 of the United States Code, which
provides criminal penalties for desecration of the flag, clearly stated that
the "flag of the United States" includes "any picture or representation"
of the flag, or any part or parts of it, "made of any substance or repre-
sented on any substance, of any size" [if an] "average person seeing the
same without deliberation may believe the same to represent the flag."' 175
Most state statutes define the flag similarly.' 76
our flag."), overruled on other grounds by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("[I]ts red is our
lifeblood, its stars our world, its blue our heaven. It owns our land. At will it throws away our
lives.") (quoting O.W. HOLMES, John Marshall (1901), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 266,
270-71 (1920)), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972).
170. 4 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
171. Id. § 2.
172. See Exec. Order No. 10834, 3 C.F.R. 367 (1959), reprinted in 4 U.S.C. § 1 app. at 377-
78 (1982).
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Joyce, 454 F.2d at 981 (punishing desecration of 3x5 inch flag: "A little
American flag is entitled to the same protection as a large one.").
175. 18 U.S.C. § 700(b) (1982) (amended 1989). The recent amendment to this section de-
leted the requirement that the representation of the flag be recognizable. It may be impossible
to tell what a "flag" is under the amended statute. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying
text.
176. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3703.C.2 (1989) ("'flag' means any emblem,
banner or other symbol, of any size, composed of any substance or represented on any sub-
stance that evidently purports to be the flag of the United States or of this state."); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 5-51-207(b) (1987) ("The words 'flag,' 'colors,' 'coat of arms,' or 'insignia' used herein
include also any picture or representation or simulation of the same."); CAL. MIL. & VET.
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Generally, for purposes of desecration law, any physical representa-
tion of the flag is considered to be the flag. 177 If a miscreant manufac-
tures a flag with fifty-one stars, then abuses and defiles it, he commits a
desecration of the flag. The fifty-first star does not change the nature of
the offense. 178 Similarly, abuse and defilement of a flag with orange and
cream stripes and a turquoise union is no less a desecration of the flag
because it is discolored. 179 If the object is recognizable as a representa-
tion of the flag, it must be treated with the respect it deserves. 180
2. "Physical desecration"
Desecration is a broad concept. The word "desecrate" is based on
the Latin root sacrare and literally means to treat as, or to render, unholy
CODE § 61 1(c) (West 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-11-204(d)(2) (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
1, para. 3352 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 32.3 (West 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4114(a) (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:116 (West 1986) (flag includes "any copy
thereof"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 252 (1964); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 § 81 (1988 &
Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.40(1) (West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-7-39 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
8-215(1) (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-928(2) (1985); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 136(g) (Mc-
Kinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-07-02 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 372(c)
(West 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102(c) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-15-1
(1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-210 (Law. Co-op 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-9-
1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-5-841 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1901 (1974); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-486 (1988); WASH. REv. CODE § 9.86.010 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-1-8
(1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.05(2) (West 1982); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 1326 (1983); see
Van Slyke v. State, 489 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), appeal dismissed, 418 U.S.
907 (1974); State v. Claxton, 7 Wash. App. 598, 599, 501 P.2d 192, 193 (1972) (applying
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.86.010 (1988)).
Although Indiana departs from the general view that a representation of the flag is the
flag, its desecration statute does punish desecration of representations: "A person who know-
ingly or intentionally, and publicly, damages, defiles, or walks on a United States flag, stan-
dard, or ensign, or a picture or representation of such a flag, standard, or ensign, commits flag
desecration, a class A misdemeanor." IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-4 (Bums 1985) (emphasis
added). Courts, for the most part, do not apply such definitions. See, e.g., Halter v. Nebraska,
205 U.S. 34, 38 n.1 (1907); Bowles v. State, 168 Ga. App. 763, 764, 310 S.E.2d 250, 252 (1983)
(upholding convictions and one year sentences for desecration of small paper flags), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984); State v. Saulino, 29 Ohio Misc. 25, 28-29, 277 N.E.2d 580, 582-83
(1971) (flag painted on van). But see Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585, 588 (W.D.N.C.
1971) (condemning such definition as "simply unbelievable").
177. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3703(C)(2) (1989); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE
§ 611(c) (West 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1, para. 3352 (Smith-Hurd 1980); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. I § 252 (West 1964).
178. See generally CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 611(c) (West 1988) (Flag includes any flag or
representation upon which colors, stars and stripes appear in any number by which average
person would believe is flag or representation).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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that which is sacred. I"" As a matter of common English usage, "to dese-
crate" an object means "[to take away its consecrated or sacred charac-
ter," "to treat [it] as not sacred or hallowed, to profane" it, or "to divert
[it] from a sacred to a profane purpose." ' '2 "To profane" the flag is "[to
treat (what is sacred) with irreverence, contempt, or disregard," or to
misuse or abuse it.'8 3 A profane purpose is one "[n]ot pertaining or de-
voted to what is sacred or biblical." '84 Commercial advertising and
political fundraising are two examples of profane purposes to which a
truly holy object ought not be diverted.
Obviously, no one can take from the flag its consecrated or hallowed
status.18 5 The proposed amendment's reference to "physical desecra-
tion" can comprehend no such offense. Physical representations of the
flag may be treated with "disregard" for the flag's special status, and thus
to treat it as "not sacred" or hallowed. The flag may also be misused for
worldly purposes, or otherwise abused. Since any image of our flag is to
be considered the flag itself, and must be treated with absolute respect,
frivolous representations of it must be thought of as desecrations. 
1 6
181. E. PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENG-
LISH 579 (1983). The Latin sacer means "sacred." Its derivative, sacrare, means "to treat as,
[or] to render, sacred." Id.
182. IV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 514 (2d ed. 1989) (a. "trans. To take away its
consecrated or sacred character from (anything); to treat as not sacred or hallowed; to profane.
b. To divert from a sacred to a profane purpose .. "); see also OXFORD AMERICAN DICTION-
ARY 173 (1980) ("to treat (a sacred thing) with irreverence or disrespect"); RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 390 (Unabridged Ed. 1983) ("1. to divest of sacred
or hallowed character or office. 2. to divert from a sacred to a profane use or purpose. 3. to
treat with sacrilege; profane."); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 610
(Unabridged 1966) ("la: to violate the sanctity of by diverting from sacred purpose, by con-
taminating, or by defiling .... b: to divest of sacred character or treat as unhallowed. .. ").
183. XII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 570 (2d ed. 1989) (la "trans. To treat (what is
sacred) with irreverence, contempt, or disregard; to desecrate, violate. b. To misuse, abuse
(what ought to be held in reverence or respect); to violate, defile, pollute.").
184. Id. (". Not pertaining or devoted to what is sacred or biblical, esp. in profane history,
literature; unconsecrated, secular, lay, common; civil, as distinguished from ecclesiastical.").
185. See Hertzberg, supra note 168, at 4.
186. As one California court observed:
Three out of thousands of American-flag-depicted articles will suffice as illustrations:
(1) The decals on the back windows of the automobiles of motorists, (2) a martini
toothpick mounted with a flag designed to spear an olive, and (3) a picnic napkin
decorated with a flag and intended for the garbage can after use. All of these come
within the unequivocal, unambiguous terms of section 611 [defining "flag"] as acts
made punishable by section 614, subdivision (d) [punishing desecration].
Alford v. Municipal Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 244, 246-47, 102 Cal. Rptr. 667, 668 (1972), cert.
denied sub nom. California v. Municipal Court, 409 U.S. 1109 (refusing to enforce state's flag
desecration law on first amendment grounds). See also People v. Picking, 23 N.Y.S.2d 148,
149 (1940) (flag painted on automobile), aff'd, 263 A.D. 366, 33 N.Y.S.2d 317, 317-18 (1942),
aff'd, 288 N.Y. 644, 42 N.E.2d 741 (1943), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 632 (1943); Saulino, 29 Ohio
Misc. at 25, 277 N.E.2d at 581 (convicted for display of "an American flag painted across the
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"Physical desecration" literally refers to any conduct in relation to
the flag that is not proper in light of its hallowed status."' A physical
representation of the flag need not actually be physically damaged in or-
der for the flag to be desecrated.
88
3. Legal usage
Legal usage does not narrow the import of the word "desecration"
as it appears in the President's proposed amendment. The Constitution's
words and phrases are to be taken at "their normal and ordinary as dis-
tinguished from technical meaning." 189 If legal usage placed a special,
technical meaning on the word "desecration," that fact would have little
relevance to construction of the word in a constitutional sense. Even if
reference to legal usage is made, it does not serve to narrow the concept
of desecration. The law does not provide a generally accepted technical
meaning of "desecration" that is any different from the ordinary one.
Although statutes prohibiting abuse or misuse of the flag often carry
the word "desecration" in their titles, the operative provisions of those
desecration statutes usually omit the word "desecration" and generally
do not purport to define it. 190 The few state statutes that provide a spe-
cial definition of desecration that clearly limits the word's meaning, rec-
entire side wall of [the defendant's] truck. In the field where the stars should be appeared a
huge face of 'Mickey Mouse.' "); but see Baisch v. State, 76 Misc. 2d 1006, 1009-10, 351
N.Y.S.2d 617, 620-21 (Ct. CI. 1974) (flag painted on van is not desecration within New York's
General Business Law section 136(b) which prohibits use of flag on merchandise).
187. A law prohibiting desecration thus "in effect requires worship of the flag by compelling
a series of taboos concerning flag display." Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn,
437 F.2d 344, 349 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd mem, 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
188. See statutes cited infra note 205.
189. Sprague, 282 U.S. at 731.
190. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-3401 (1987) ("Public mutilation of flag.-Any person who
publicly mutilates, defaces, or tramples upon or bums, with intent to insult, the flag, standard,
colors or ensign of the United States or of the state of Idaho shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor."); NEVADA REV. STAT. § 201.290.1 (1986) ("Any person who, in any manner, for
exhibition or display, puts or causes to be placed any inscription, design, device, symbol, por-
trait, name, advertisement, words, character, marks or notice, or sets or places any goods,
wares and merchandise whatever upon any flag or ensign of the United States, or state flag of
this state, or ensign, evidently purporting to be either of the flags or ensign, or who in any
manner appends, annexes, or affixes to any such flag or ensign any inscription, design, device,
symbol, portrait, name, advertisement, words, marks, notice or token whatever, or who dis-
plays or exhibits or causes to be displayed or exhibited any flag or ensign, evidently purporting
to be either of the flags, upon which shall in any manner be put, attached, annexed or affixed
any inscription, design, device, symbol, portrait, name, advertisement, words, marks, notice or
token whatever, or who publicly or willfully mutilates, tramples upon, or who tears down or
willfully and maliciously removes while owned by others or defames, slanders, or speaks evilly
or in a contemptuous manner of or otherwise defaces or defiles any of the flags, or ensign,
which are public or private property, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.").
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ognize that the word could encompass a much broader range of
conduct.' 91 The conduct which could be described as "desecration" does
not have a legal meaning uniformly different from its ordinary meaning.
Conduct that is prohibited and punished under the rubric of dese-
cration varies widely from state to state. The limited reach of certain
state laws cannot be relied on to redefine and narrow the concept of dese-
cration as it appears in the proposed. amendment. Several states have
chosen to punish virtually the total range of conduct comprehended by
the concept of desecration. 192 Even within a single state, the reach of
desecration statutes changes from time to time to either broaden or nar-
row their reach. For example, California and Texas amended their stat-
utes in 1970193 and 1989194 respectively.
An attempt to limit the meaning of the word "desecration" as a
constitutional term by reference to what a plurality of states choose to
punish under the designation of desecration would be an exercise in se-
mantics rather than a principled decision of law.
Particular desecration statutes have been given narrow construc-
tions based upon their specific language.' 9 This largely stems from the
general rule that criminal statutes, including desecration statutes, must
191. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3703.C.1 (1989) ("For the purposes of this
section: 1. 'Desecrate' means defacing, damaging, polluting or otherwise doing a physical act
in a manner likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation.").
192. See infra notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
193. Act of 1970, ch. 1364, 1970 Cal. Stat. 2531 § 2. Section 614 narrowed the amendment
which had read:
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor who:
(a) In any manner for exhibition or display, places or causes to appear any
work, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing, or any advertisement of any nature
upon any flag of the United States or of this State.
(b) Exposes to public view any such flag upon which is printed, painted, or
placed or to which is attached, appended, affixed or annexed any word, figure, mark,
picture, design, drawing, or any advertisement of any nature.
(c) Exposes to public view, manufactures, sells, exposes for sale, gives away, or
has in possession for sale or to give away or for use for any purpose any article or
substance being an article of merchandise or a receptacle of merchandise or article or
thing for carrying or transporting merchandise upon which is printed, painted, at-
tached or placed a representation of any such flag, standard, color, or ensign to ad-
vertise, call attention to, decorate, mark or distinguish the article or substance on
which so placed.
(d) Publicly mutilates, defaces, defiles, or tramples any such flag.
CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 614 (1935), amended by CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 614 (1970).
The statute now reads: "A person is guilty of a misdemeanor who knowingly casts contempt
upon any Flag of the United States or of this state by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling,
burning, or trampling upon it." CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 614 (West 1988).
194. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1253, § 2, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5055-56 (Vernon) (to be
codified at TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.09). See also Steele, The Impact of the New Penal Code on
First Amendment Freedoms, 38 TEX. BAR. J. 245 (1975).
195. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1971); State v. Kool,
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be strictly construed.196 Constitutional provisions, such as amendments,
however, must be broadly construed unless doing so would produce con-
flict within the constitutional text.' 97 The narrow limitations of statutory
construction cannot be applied when constitutional provisions are
interpreted.1
98
State courts have limited the reach of some desecration statutes
through strict construction of the language of the statutes or by eliminat-
ing words which would otherwise make the statute overbroad, in order to
avoid first amendment concerns. 199 Legislatures, too, have redrafted des-
ecration statutes and narrowed their scope to respond to first amendment
objections."° In Texas, for example, the statute was revised in light of
three first amendment cases.2° '
Reliance on desecration laws narrowed to meet or avoid first amend-
ment objections would be contrary to the currently unarticulated, but
probable, fundamental purpose of the proposed amendment: to overrule
first amendment objections. It would be absurd to interpret such an
amendment by referring to state laws that reflect efforts by legislatures or
212 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa 1973); State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 339, 342, 25 A.2d 491, 492
(1942).
196. W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-r, CRIMINAL LAW § 10 (1972).
197. E. CHERMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION xii (1987) (protecting cher-
ished values "can be best achieved by a judiciary with broad discretion in interpreting the
Constitution").
198. Broad interpretation of constitutional provisions is one of the most basic principles of
our jurisprudence. In Justice John Marshall's words:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great
powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution,
would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the
human mind. . . . [W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution . . . we are
expounding.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819); see generally Crosson, 462 F.2d
at 98-99 (citing doctrine to affirm conviction for desecration); 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J.
YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 3.3 at 209-
13 (2d ed. 1986).
199. See, e.g., Jones v. Wade, 479 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1973), reaff'd, 504 F.2d 427
(1974) ("The Texas courts have substantially narrowed the scope of this statute to remove
constitutional defects."); People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 923, 926, 78 Cal. Rptr.
853, 855 (1969) (adopting narrow construction of "defile" to avoid constitutional objections),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 371 (1970). See also State v. Liska, 32 Ohio App. 2d 317, 318, 291
N.E.2d 498, 499 (1971) (adopting narrow construction of Ohio's statutory language because
"it is our duty to avoid constitutional issues if the questions presented can be disposed of on
any other basis"). In order to uphold desecration statutes against charges of facial overbreadth
many courts have stricken words from the statute that might otherwise suggest that criminal
liability may turn on the utterance of words. See, e.g., Van Slyke, 489 S.W.2d at 592; State v.
Royal, 113 N.H. 224, 305 A.2d 676, 678 (1973).
200. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989).
201. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1253 § 2, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5055-56 (Vernon) (to be
codified at TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.09).
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courts to come within the bounds of the first amendment. Since state
laws would no longer be limited by the first amendment, any reliance on
them would subvert the unarticulated purpose of the proposed
amendment.
4. State laws, injury and intent
Consideration of state flag-desecration laws confirms several impor-
tant points which foreshadow the great breadth that the word "desecra-
tion," as a constitutional concept, invites. Legal usage generally does not
require the flag to be damaged in any way to be desecrated.202 It does
not require the desecration be public, 203 nor does it require intent to in-
sult or damage the flag.' °
First, many states have made clear that the flag may be desecrated
without suffering any tangible physical injury. 05 The proposed amend-
ment's use of the words "physical desecration" reflects this distinction.20 6
Although the proposed amendment does not purport to reach non-physi-
cal desecration, such as verbal abuse or untoward thoughts, its words do
not suggest that the flag must be physically damaged to be desecrated.
Even if limited to physical acts, the word "desecration" encompasses far
more than mutilation or destruction of the flag. One who spits on the
flag desecrates it, even if the saliva does no physical damage; one who
202. See infra note 205.
203. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
204. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
205. See, eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-51-207(a)(4) (1987) (outlawing desecration "by word
or act"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 256.06 (West 1975) ("by word or act"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 32.1
(West 1987 & Supp. 1989) ("either by words or act"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116(4) (West
1986) ("by word or act"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 254 (1964) ("by word or act"); MD.
PUB. SAFETY CODE ANN. art. 27, § 83 (1987) ("by word or act"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.246 (West 1968) ("by word or act"); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.290 (Michie 1986)
("defames, slanders, or speaks evilly or in a contemptuous manner"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
21-4(B) (1984) ("offering any insult by word or act"); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 136(d) (McKin-
ney 1988) ("by word or act"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 372(a) (West 1983) ("by word or
act"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-15-2 (1981) ("by word or act"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-220
(Law. Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1988) ("by word or act"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-5-843 (1982)
("by word or act"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1903 (1974) ("by word or act"); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-1-8 (1989) ("by words or acts"); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 1325 (1984) ("by word or
act"). See also Johnson v. State, 204 Ark. 476, 477, 163 S.W.2d 153 (1942); Taylor v. State,
194 Miss. 1, 37, 11 So. 2d 663, 674, rev'd, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); Cummings v. State, 194 Miss.
59, 60, 11 So. 2d 683, 684 (1942), rev'd, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); Benoit v. State, 194 Miss. 74, 75,
11 So. 2d 689, 689-90 (1942), rev'd, 319 U.S. 583 (1943). Such a provision appeared in the
initial draft of the federal statute, but was removed at the instance of the Attorney General
because of first amendment concerns. See H.R. REP. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967).
206. The proposed constitutional amendment states: "The Congress and the States shall
have the power to prohibit physical desecration of the flag of the United States." H.R.J. Res.
350, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REc. E2247 (1989).
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"flips the bird" at the flag physically desecrates it without even touching
it.
Second, although many states concern themselves primarily with
"public" desecration when drafting their criminal laws,2" 7 desecration as
a legal term is not limited to conduct performed in public.20 8 The dese-
cration statutes of several states clearly prohibit private desecration.20 9
Third, the desecrator's intent is typically not an element of the of-
fense. However, a few states require that an evil intention must underlie
an act of desecration before it may be criminally punished.210 As a gen-
207. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-12 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-51-207(4) (1987);
CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 614 (West 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-11-204 (1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-258a (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1331 (1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 256.06, 876.52 (West 1975); HAw. REv. STAT. § 711-1107(c) (1985); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-3401 (1987); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1, para. 3351 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE § 35-45-
1-4 (Bums 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4114(b) (Vernon 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 525.110(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985 & Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116 (West
1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 253.2, 254 (1987); MD. PUB. SAFETY CODE art. 27,
§ 82 (1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 5 (West 1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 162.720(4) (Anderson 1987).
In addition several states prohibit desecration only if it is likely to provoke immediate
physical retaliation, which apparently permits private desecration. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3703.C.1. (1989). This may reflect a doctrine developed by several courts that a
prosecution for desecration does not violate the first amendment where there is a risk of breach
of the peace. See, eg., Monroe v. State Court, 739 F.2d 568, 575 (1lth Cir. 1984) ("imminence
of public unrest or a clear and present danger of breach of the peace... is required under the
constitution"); People v. Lindsay, 51 Ill. 2d 399, 406-07, 282 N.E.2d 431, 435 (1972).
Several opinions address the public/private distinction. See Peacock, 138 Me. at 342, 25
A.2d at 492 ("[T]he very essence of this offense is its publicity."); Robey v. State, 76 Misc. 2d
1032, 351 N.Y.S.2d 788, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (no punishable desecration because flag on interior
wall of van was not exposed to public view); Claxton, 7 Wash. App. at 599, 501 P.2d at 193
(reversing conviction because, under Section 9.86.030 of the Washington Code, desecration is
punishable only if "done in public").
Several state statutes outlawing desecration contain no requirement that the prohibited
conduct be public. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-9 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-601
(1978).
208. Some courts have held that the first amendment is violated if the desecration punished
did not create an immediate danger of a breach of the peace. See, e.g., Monroe, 739 F.2d at
575; United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court, 385 F. Supp. 165, 180-82 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Cline v. Rockingham County Superior Court, 367 F. Supp. 1146, 1152 (D.N.H. 1973)
(New Hampshire law unconstitutional because "not limited to 'public' desecration"), aff'd,
502 F.2d 789 (Ist Cir. 1974); State v. Farrell, 209 N.W.2d 103, 106-07 (Iowa 1973), vacated,
418 U.S. 907 (1974); State v. Kool, 212 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 1973).
209. For example, Tennessee prohibits public desecration under section 39-5-843 of its
Code; other willful desecration is prohibited by section 39-5-845 of the Tennessee Code, and
the section makes no reference to any requirement of public conduct. TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-5-843-845 (1982).
210. For example, Virginia requires evil intent. Franz v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 587, 588-
89, 186 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1972). Ohio also requires evil intent. State v. Kasnett, 34 Ohio St. 2d
193, 198 n.3, 297 N.E.2d 537, 540 n.3 (1973) (1967 amendment to Ohio statute made intent
"immaterial"); but see State v. Mitchell, 32 Ohio App. 2d 16, 21, 288 N.E.2d 216, 220-21
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eral rule, courts hold that such intent is not an element of the offense of
desecration.2 n In some states, desecration and malicious desecration are
punishable under separate statutes.2 2
Even where statutes require that, to be punishable, the desecration
must be "knowing" or "intentional," courts usually hold that only the
acts committed must have been done intentionally; the defendant need
not have been aware that they were improper.213 Therefore, "specific
intent" is not an element of desecration. Only objective actions are con-
sidered; specific intent to desecrate or show disrespect is legally irrelevant
so long as the improper actions are themselves intended.2" 4 Therefore,
desecration as a legal term is not more restrictive than desecration in its
ordinary sense. Cases holding that specific, malicious intent is an ele-
(1972); Cincinnati v. Bunch, 32 Ohio App. 2d 161, 164, 288 N.E.2d 854, 856 (1971). Wash-
ington also requires intent. State v. Turner, 78 Wash. 2d 276, 281, 474 P.2d 91, 94-95 (1970).
211. State v. Hodsdon, 289 A.2d 635, 638 (Del. Super. Ct.) (1972) ("The conduct prohib-
ited cannot be defined in terms of attitudes.") (citing Hodsdon v. Buckson, 444 F.2d 533, 534
(3d Cir. 1971)); Kool, 212 N.W.2d at 520 (specific intent to desecrate not element); State v.
Waterman, 190 N.W.2d 809, 813 (Iowa 1971) (specific intent to desecrate need not be proved);
State v. Royal, 113 N.H. 224, 227, 305 A.2d 676, 679 (1973) (words "cast contempt" in flag
desecration statute refers to effect of prohibited acts, and not to intention of actor), writ denied,
397 F. Supp. 260 (D.N.H. 1975); State v. Schlueter, 127 N.J.L. 496, 499, 23 A.2d 249, 250-51
(1946) (desecration proved if actions are intended, and have effect of publicly mutilating, tram-
pling upon or otherwise defacing or defiling flag even if committed without malice or evil
intent); People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 125, 257 N.E.2d 30, 36, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 854
(1970) ("[E]ven if we assume that defendant had an honest political intent... or that lie had
no intent at all, that element is not essential to a conviction of violating a statute which is
malumprohibitum."), aff'd sub nom. Robey v. State, 76 Misc. 2d 1032, 351 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Ct.
Cl. 1973) (desecration is malum prohibitum and no criminal intent is required); People v.
Keough, 38 A.D.2d 293, 295, 329 N.Y.S.2d 80, 82 (1972) (intent is not an element of the
offense), rev'd on other grounds, 31 N.Y.2d 281, 283-84, 290 N.E.2d 819, 820, 338 N.Y.S.2d
618, 619 (1972); Mitchell, 32 Ohio App. 2d at 21, 288 N.E.2d at 221 (desecration malum
prohibitum and offense need not be knowingly committed); Bunch, 32 Ohio App. 2d at 163,
288 N.E.2d at 856 ("R.C. section 2921.05 does not require that intent be proven"); State v.
Sinniger, 6 Or. App. 145, 149, 486 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (1972) (desecration malum prohibitum
and specific intent to defile flag need not be shown); State v. Spence, 81 Wash. 2d 788, 792, 506
P.2d 293, 297 (1973), rev'd, 481 U.S. 405 (1974) (evil intent or design not element of desecra-
tion). See also Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2557 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(" '[D]esecration' does not turn on the substance of the message the actor intends to convey").
But see Franz, 212 Va. at 589, 186 S.E.2d at 72; id. at 73 (Carrico, J., dissenting) ("The major-
ity holds, without so saying that the statute in question is malum in se rather than malum
prohibitum.... [I]t must appear not only that the defendant committed some act which cast
contempt upon the flag but also that he intended the flag should thereby be debased.").
212. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. section 39-5-847 (1982) (applies where defendant has a
specific intent to desecrate the flag and imposes minimum fine or sentence) with section 39-5-
845 (provides penalties for crimes of desecration not involving malicious intent).
213. See Franz, 212 Va. 587, 588-89, 186 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1972); State v. Kasnett, 34 Ohio St.
2d 193, 198 n.3, 297 N.E.2d 537, 540 n.3 (1973); State v. Turner, 78 Wash. 2d 276, 281, 474
P.2d 91, 94-95 (1970).
214. See e.g., Royal, 113 N.H. at 227-28, 305 A.2d at 678-79.
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ment of the crime of desecration, do so based on specific statutory lan-
guage not because intent is included within the ordinary concept of
desecration. 215 However, in terms of statutory analysis, some of these
opinions may be flawed.216
Consideration of a few state laws is helpful to demonstrate the
breadth of conduct various states have outlawed as desecration. In New
Jersey, punishable desecration of the flag consists of "defacing, damaging
or polluting it." '217 In Ohio, the offense proscribes actions that "pur-
posely deface, damage, pollute, or otherwise physically mistreat" the
flag.218 In Arizona, unlawful desecration encompasses "defacing, dam-
aging, polluting or otherwise doing a physical act in a manner likely to
provoke immediate physical retaliation.
'219
The New Mexico statute defines the offense more broadly by includ-
ing specific commercial uses of the flag.220 Oklahoma makes it unlawful
to use the flag for any "trademark or label. 221  The desecration statute
215. See supra note 210. In United States v. Crosson, the Ninth Circuit wrote:
It is argued that 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) makes it a crime for burning a flag, while 36
U.S.C. § 176(k) authorized burning of the same flag. The distinction lies in the pur-
pose and intent of the actor. The flag may be destroyed under § 176a) only when it
is in 'such condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem for display', while § 700(a)
requires the actor to cast 'contempt' upon the flag by publicly burning it.
462 F.2d 96, 100 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226, 229-31
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (MacKinnon, J., concurring) (suggesting that specific intent to desecrate is
element of desecration under federal criminal statute); Joyce, 454 F.2d at 992 ("Knowingly"
language under federal criminal statute requires defendant to be aware that he is casting con-
tempt upon flag by his acts).
216. In a prosecution for violation of the federal statute, defendants, "over their own objec-
tion, were forbidden to introduce any evidence or argument at trial as to the purposes of the
[demonstration at which the flag was desecrated] or as to their intent." Kime v. United States,
459 U.S. 949, 950 n.1 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The defend-
ants were convicted and imprisoned; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari. Id. at 949. See also People v. Vaughan, 183 Colo. 40, 514 P.2d 1318 (1973);
Lindsay, 282 N.E.2d at 435, 51 111. 2d at 406 (1972).
Moreover, legislative history suggests that the federal statutes prohibit only intentionally
willful acts of desecration. See S. REP. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3. But see Royal, 113
N.H. at 227, 305 A.2d at 679 ("The words 'cast contempt' are directed to the effect of the
prohibited acts and not to the intention of the actor.").
217. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-9 (West 1982).
218. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.11(A)(1) (Anderson 1987).
219. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3703.C.1 (1989).
220. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-21-4 (1984). The statute states:
A. the use of the state or national flags for any purpose other than the pur-
poses for which it was designed by law;
B. offering any insult by word or act to the state or national flags; or
C. using the state or national flags for advertising purposes by painting, print-
ing, stamping or otherwise placing thereon or affixing thereto any name or object not
connected with the patriotic history of the nation or the state.
Id.
221. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 371 (West 1983).
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also prohibits any other public conduct which "brings shame or disgrace
upon any flag of the United States by its use for unpatriotic or profane
purpose." '222 The Montana statute places a comprehensive ban on use of
the flag for commercial purposes.223
Several other states make it a crime to violate the federal Flag
Code's rules of flag etiquette.224 Essentially, these state statutes and
cases codify the rules of respect for the flag promulgated in the United
States Code.225 Consideration of these statutes demonstrates the perva-
siveness of flag desecration and indicates why the proposed amendment
could permit selective prosecution of a few offenders.
V. SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
By focusing attention on "physical desecration," the proposed con-
stitutional amendment appears to incorporate as constitutional doctrine
the general rule that intent to show disrespect for the flag is not an ele-
ment of the offense of desecration. 226 The remaining question will be
whether the physical conduct was objectively "proper." The amend-
ment's focus on physical conduct suggests that Congress and the states
shall not have the power to criminalize either verbal abuse of the flag, or
evil thoughts about it. Thus, on its face, the proposed amendment ap-
pears to leave intact constitutional protection of what a citizen says or
thinks about the flag.22 7
Nonetheless, if the proposed amendment is construed as overruling
Texas v. Johnson, its true thrust must be that where a physical desecra-
222. Id. § 372(b).
223. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-215(2) (1988). The Montana statute states:
A person commits the offense of desecration of flags if he purposely or knowingly:
(a) publicly mutilates, defiles, or casts contempt upon the flag;
(b) places on or attaches to the flag any work, mark, design, or advertisement
not properly a part of such flag or exposes to public view a flag so altered;
(c) manufactures or exposes to public view an article of merchandise or a wrap-
per or receptacle for merchandise upon which the flag is depicted; or
(d) uses the flag for commercial advertising purposes.
Id.
224. See, eg., State v. Bunch, 26 Ohio Misc. 161, 163, 268 N.E.2d 831, 832 (1970) (defend-
ant convicted under Ohio's flag-desecration statute for his intentional violation of sections
176(a), (d), and (h) of the Flag Code), aff'd sub nom. Cincinnati v. Bunch, 32 Ohio App. 2d
161, 288 N.E.2d 854 (1971). See also infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
225. 36 U.S.C. §§ 173-78.
226. See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
227. For examples of this protection, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)
("Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to
control men's minds."). See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) ("In
a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced
by the State.").
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tion has been committed, the first amendment should not bar prosecution
even if the prosecution is based on purely political factors such as the
communicative content of the act, political views or social status of the
person committing the desecration.
Furthermore, selective prosecution is likely because disrespectful
treatment of the flag is so prevalent that if the government were to root
out physical desecration through legal action, we could expect thousands
of prosecutions. Evenhanded application of the desecration laws would
jam the courts. Although under Texas v. Johnson 228 most physical dese-
cration of the flag can be outlawed and prosecuted, laws requiring proper
treatment of the flag are rarely enforced. Occasionally, however, individ-
uals are prosecuted under flag-desecration statutes. These prosecutions
are often pursued when the individual has made politically unpopular
statements while desecrating the flag.2 29 Thus, there is a history of selec-
tive prosecution.
A. Provisions of the Flag Code
To fully appreciate how widespread desecration is, and why the pro-
posed amendment may permit prosecution of only a few special cases,
one must be familiar with the rules requiring respectful conduct in rela-
tion to our nation's flag. Some of these rules are codified in the "Flag
Code."230 The Flag Code's provisions indicate the broad range of con-
duct regarded as desecration. Section 176 of the Flag Code commands
that "[n]o disrespect shall be shown to the flag of the United States of
America, '"231 and provides an extensive list of measures which should be
observed in order to avoid abuse of the flag.
Other sections of the Flag Code provide additional rules of respect-
ful conduct involving the flag, including discussion of how and when the
228. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
229. See, eg., Monroe v. State Court, 739 F.2d 568 (l1th Cir. 1984) (defendant burned
American flag during demonstration against United States' involvement in Iranian affairs);
United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96 (9th Cir.) (defendant burned American flag in protest of
Vietnam war), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (defendant wore shirt resembling American flag to appearance before Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities).
230. 36 U.S.C. §§ 173-78 (1982).
231. Id. § 176. Section 176 further provides as follows:
(a) The flag should never be displayed with the union down, except as a signal
of dire distress in instances of extreme danger to life or property.
(b) The flag should never touch anything beneath it, such as the ground, the
floor, water, or merchandise.
(c) The flag should never be carried flat or horizontally, but always aloft and
free.
(d) The flag should never be used as wearing apparel, bedding, or drapery. It
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flag should be displayed.2 32 Moreover, other provisions of law require
respectful conduct toward the flag when it is hoisted or lowered,233 when
the pledge of allegiance is recited, 23 4 and when the national anthem is
played.
235
These laws regulate the flag's treatment as a sacred symbol; to
breach the laws is to treat the flag improperly. Any failure to show the
flag proper respect, as defined in the Flag Code and other state laws, may
be regarded a desecration of the flag because desecration encompasses
any treatment that is inconsistent with the flag's status as a sacred
symbol.
Although the Flag Code itself provides no penalties, 236 violations of
it can be criminally punished under state laws. For example, violations
of the Flag Code may be prosecuted under a state's general flag-desecra-
should never be festooned, drawn back, nor up, in folds, but always allowed to fall
free....
(e) The flag should never be fastened, displayed, used, or stored in such a man-
ner as to permit it to be easily torn, soiled, or damaged in any way.
(f) The flag should never be used as a covering for a ceiling.
(g) The flag should never have placed upon it, nor on any part of it, nor at-
tached to it any mark, insignia, letter, word, figure, design, picture, or drawing of any
nature.
(h) The flag should never be used as a receptacle for receiving, holding, carry-
ing, or delivering anything.
(i) The flag should never be used for advertising in any manner whatsoever. It
should not be embroidered on such articles as cushions or handkerchiefs and the like,
printed or otherwise impressed on paper napkins or boxes or anything that is
designed for temporary use and discard. Advertising signs should not be fastened to a
staff or halyard from which the flag is flown.
0) No part of the flag should ever be used as a costume or athletic uniform....
(k) The flag, when it is in such condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem for
display, should be destroyed in a dignified way, preferably by burning.
Id.
232. 36 U.S.C. §§ 174 & 175 (1982).
233. See id. § 177.
234. See id. § 172.
235. See id. § 171.
236. In Texas v. Johnson, Justice Brennan termed the Flag Code's provisions "precatory."
109 S. Ct. 2533, 2547 (1989). A related case, Delaware v. Hodsdon, held that the Flag Code's
rules by themselves compel no obedience, but that they give free reign to states to prosecute
violations of the Code under the State's own criminal laws. 265 F. Supp. 308, 310 (1967). See
also Commonwealth v. Lorenc, 220 Pa. Super. 64, 67 n.2, 281 A.2d 743, 744 n.2 (1971). In
Lappolla v. Dullaghan, a New York trial. court enjoined flying the flag at half-staff to memori-
alize students shot at Kent State, noting that "the United States code provisions are not to be
accorded the full weight of statutory proscription but . . . are an expression of custom and
usage which is designed for and should be used by civil authorities, including school districts."
63 Misc. 2d 157, 159, 311 N.Y.S.2d 435, 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). The court held that "[t]he
flag should not be a vehicle for the expression of political, social or economic philosophy," and
prohibited its display at half-staff to honor the Kent State dead. Id. at 162-63, 311 N.Y.S.2d at
440-41.
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tion statute that provides criminal penalties.237 In Ohio, violation of the
Flag Code's provisions can be the basis for a criminal conviction under
the state desecration law, although the state statute does not specifically
refer to the Flag Code.238 Tennessee has adopted the provisions of sec-
tion 176 of the Flag Code, and made violations of any of its terms a
criminal offense.239 In Delaware, a federal court held that the state could
prosecute a citizen for criminal desecration of the flag. The defendant
had violated section 175(c) of the Flag Code by "flying the flag of the
United Nations above and to the right of the American flag in front of his
residence." 2' Similarly, Maine's statute provides that "flying the United
States flag in any manner in violation of the Federal United States Flag
Code" is a crime.24 1 In Pennsylvania, a citizen was convicted of dese-
crating the flag by flying it beneath the flag of the Soviet Union.242
237. See, e.g., State v. Bunch, 26 Ohio Misc. 161, 268 N.E.2d 831 (1970), aff'd sub nom.
Cincinnati v. Bunch, 32 Ohio App. 2d 161, 288 N.E.2d 854 (1971).
238. Id. at 163, 268 N.E.2d at 832. In Bunch, the defendant was convicted under Ohio's
flag-desecration statute for his intentional violation of sections 176 (a), (d), and (h) of the Flag
Code. Id. In State v. Liska, an Ohio court referred to the Flag Code to interpret provisions of
its own desecration law. 26 Ohio Misc. 9, 268 N.E.2d 824 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 32
Ohio App. 2d 317, 291 N.E.2d 498 (1971). However, State v. Kasnett casts some doubt on
these holdings by stating that wearing the flag on clothing cannot be said to fall within the
prohibitions of Ohio's desecration statute. 34 Ohio St. 2d 193, 198, 297 N.E.2d 537, 540
(1973). The court failed to note that the Flag Code provides clear directions as to wearing the
flag, and reversed a conviction because it could find no basis for "the judicial line-drawing"
required. Id. at 197, 297 N.E.2d at 539. Whether reference to the Flag Code would have
produced a different result is open to question.
239. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-842, 39-5-845 (1982).
240. Hodsdon, 265 F. Supp. at 308. In Hodsdon, the State of Delaware sued its citizen in
federal court, seeking a federal injunction preventing him from flying the flag of the United
Nations above and to the right of the American flag. Id. The federal court dismissed the case,
holding that the Flag Code itself gave the state no right of action against its citizen in federal
court. Id. at 310. The court further stated:
This does not mean that the State is remediless; merely that it has misconceived its
remedy. If the State wishes to vindicate what it conceives of as an "irreparable harm
to the citizens of Delaware" it need look no farther that [sic] its own statutory law to
find authorization for such an action.
The proper arena for the vindication of the patriotic sensibilities of the citizens of
Delaware is the courts of that State. And, the proper mechanism to sanction behav-
ior offensive to the citizenry of Delaware is the duly enacted statutory law of that
State.
Id. The state obtained a criminal indictment based on the violation of the Flag Code. State v.
Hodsdon, 289 A.2d 635, 638 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972). However, a Delaware Superior Court
entered a judgment of acquittal, holding that even if flying the American flag in a manner
subordinate to the United Nations flag is unlawful under 36 U.S.C. § 175 it would at most,
constitute a breach of flag etiquette or civil duty, rather than a violation of state law. Id.
241. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. I, § 252-A (West 1964); see also 36 U.S.C. § 175 (1982).
242. Commonwealth v. Lorene, 220 Pa. Super. 64, 281 A.2d 743 (1971) (per curiam). A
concurring opinion acknowledged that "[t]here is no state statute dealing with the display of
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Several state courts have held that violation of the federal Flag Code
is not automatically a violation of a state's criminal desecration laws.243
This is not surprising, since the breadth of desecration statutes vary from
state to state. Every state could outlaw the full range of conduct under
the Flag Code, but some choose not to. What they have chosen to out-
law still encompasses a considerable amount of conduct that is common-
place, however improper it may be.2 "
B. Widespread Desecration
Recently, in anticipation of the July 4th holiday, banks, department
stores, record stores, discount houses, fast food chains, auto parts stores,
clothing stores, real estate brokerage houses, newspapers, magazines, and
lumber yards physically desecrated the flag. The flag was draped over
merchandise in department stores. It appeared on packaging for fire-
works, garden hoses, sound recordings, irons and cleaners. The flag was
even printed upside down on labels inside "Batman" caps. It was used on
other articles of clothing including T-shirts and bathing suits. It has also
been printed on bumper stickers. Commercial enterprises have trans-
formed the flag into an advertising medium. According to the Flag
Code, the flag is cheapened and desecrated by placing it on merchandise,
commercial packaging, or clothing.245
All these uses are disrespectful and could be classified as physical
desecrations of the flag. The flag has also been desecrated in innumerable
newspapers and magazines. For the most part, newspapers and
magazines are intended for brief use, then disposal, so that placing
images of the flag in them is a willful violation of the Flag Code, and is a
desecration of the flag. 24 6 Consequently, several states have enacted laws
specifically exempting newspapers and magazines from criminal liability
for publishing photographs or other representations of our flag, provided
their use of the flag is not connected with any advertising purpose.247
the flag and the only relevant federal statute [the Flag Code] is in fact merely a 'codification of
existing rules and customs' and carries no penalty for violation." Id. at 67 n.2, 281 A.2d at 744
n.2 (Spaulding, J., concurring). However, the conviction under Pennsylvania's general dese-
cration statute was affirmed. Id. at 65, 281 A.2d at 743.
243. See, e.g., Hodsdon, 289 A.2d at 638-39.
244. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 252-A (West 1964); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 201.290.1 (1986).
245. 36 U.S.C. § 176(b) (1982).
246. The Code states that the flag "should not be... printed or otherwise impressed on
paper napkins or boxes or anything that is designed for temporary use and discard." 36 U.S.C.
§ 176(i) (1982).
247. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3703.B.4 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-51-
207(c) (1987); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 615 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-11-205
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Thus, in those states, the press is privileged to engage in limited desecra-
tion of the flag. Massachusetts, for example, provides that criminal pun-
ishments for desecration shall not apply to representations of the flag in
periodicals.24 The exemption requires that the desecration is "not con-
nected with any advertisement and not used for advertising purposes,"
and further provides that "no words, figures, designs, or other marks
shall be placed upon the flag."24 9
Some publications, however, have exceeded the bounds these ex-
emptions are intended to permit. In reporting the Supreme Court's
Texas v. Johnson 250 decision, a national news magazine printed its article
on a photograph of Old Glory. The magazine intentionally marked the
flag with its journalistic prose.2"' Atlantic magazine's July 1989 issue
superimposed a crossword puzzle over the stars and stripes, inviting its
readers to participate in the desecration by scrawling across its face.
25 2
Although statutes granting the press a privilege to desecrate the flag
do not specifically protect advertising uses,2 3 our flag appears in maga-
zine and newspaper advertisements across the country.254 This occurs
despite the Flag Code's clear command-backed up by state criminal
laws-that "the flag should never be used for advertising purposes in any
manner whatsoever." '255 For instance, Natural History magazine, pub-
lished by the American Museum of Natural History, featured no fewer
than four advertisements using the flag in its August 1989 issue.256 Even
the official journal of the American Bar Association publishes advertise-
(1986); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 264, § 6 (1970 & Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.40(3)
(West 1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 136(g) (McKinney 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-15-3
(1981); W. VA. CODE § 61-1-8 (1989); see also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 1327 (1984).
248. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 264, § 6 (1970 & Supp. 1989). The Supreme Court of New
Jersey has condemned a similar New Jersey statute as "arbitrary discrimination." See State v.
Zimmelman, 62 N.J. 279, 287, 301 A.2d 129, 133 (1973).
249. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 264 § 6 (1970 & Supp. 1989).
250. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
251. Isaacson, O'er the Land of The Free: A decision upholding the right to burn the flag is
the best reason not to, TIME, July 3, 1989, at 14-15.
252. Cox & Rathvon, The Puzzler, ATLANTIC, July, 1989, at 99.
253. See statutes cited supra note 247 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1989, at 45; FRESHWATER & MARINE AQUARIUM,
Sept. 1989, at 31, 40; Wall St. J., July 3, 1989, at 8, col. 1 (bank advertisement).
255. See 36 U.S.C. § 176(i) (1982).
256. NAT. Hisr., Aug., 1989, at 3, 9, 19, 74. In one of these advertisements, for an oil
company, the flag is wadded up, with pieces of personal property on it. Id. at 9. See also
Cincinnati v. Bunch, 32 Ohio App. 2d 161, 288 N.E.2d 854 (1971) (affirming conviction for
placing personal property on flag). In another Natural History advertisement, this one for
Steamboat tours, trademark logos and commercial advertisements were printed on the flag.
NAT. HIST., supra, at 19.
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ments displaying the flag for commercial promotion.257 In short, dese-
cration is rampant, but prosecution is virtually nonexistent.
Use of the flag for advertising is widely considered desecration.
Many states, and the District of Columbia, specifically prohibit use of the
flag in advertising.25s New York's highest court sustained criminal con-
victions of businessmen who desecrated the flag by posting it on a com-
mercial vehicle. 259 The Attorney General of Texas advised that it would
257. See, e.g., 75 A.B.A. J. 83 (1989).
258. See, e.g., 4 U.S.C. § 3 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3702.A.2(b) (1989)
(prohibiting advertising only if likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 5-51-207(a)(5) (1987) (punishing "whoever shall in any manner display, place, or
cause to be placed, in or in connection with any advertisement of any kind, any representation
of the flag"); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-8(a) (1982) ("It shall be unlawful ... to copy, print,
publish, or otherwise use the flag of the United States ... for the purpose of advertising,
selling, or promoting the sale of any article of merchandise whatever within this state."); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 1, paras. 3351(b), (c) (Smith-Hurd 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4114(b)
(1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 116(2), (3) (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 253.2
(1964); MD. PUB. SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 82(b), (c) (1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264,
§ 5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.245 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.40.2(3), (4) (West 1987) (punishing whoever "(3) Manufactures or exposes to public
view an article of merchandise or a wrapper or receptacle for merchandise upon which the flag
is depicted; or (4) Uses the flag for commercial advertising purposes."); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-7-39 (1973); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-8-215(2)(c), (d) (1987) ("A person commits the
offense of desecration of flags if he purposely or knowingly: ... (c) Manufactures or exposes to
public view an article of merchandise or a wrapper or receptacle for merchandise upon which
the flag is depicted; or (d) uses the flag for commercial advertising purposes.); NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 201.290(1) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646:1 (III) (1986) (punish-
ing whoever "[flor purposes of advertising a product or service for sale or free distribution,
affixes a representation of the flag of the United States... to such product or on any display
whereon such product or service is advertised"); N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 136(a), (b) (Mc-
Kinney 1988); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102(a)(3) (Purdon 1983) (punishing whoever "manu-
factures, sells, exposes for sale, gives away, or has in his possession for any such purposes any
article which uses the flag for the purposes of advertisement, sale or trade"); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-15-2 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-220 (Law. Co-op 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-
5-842, 39-5-845 (1982) (outlawing and punishing use of flag "for advertising purposes in any
manner whatsoever"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-601(c) (1978) (punishing whoever "for pur-
poses of advertising a product or service for sale or for distribution, affixes a representation of
the flag of the United States ... to the product or on any display whereon the product or
service is advertised"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1902(2), (3) (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
487(2) (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.86.020(2), (3) (1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-1-8
(1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 946.06(c), (d) (West 1982) (punishing individual who "(c)
[m]anufactures or exposes to public view an article of merchandise or wrapper or receptacle
for merchandise upon which the flag is depicted; or (d) [u]ses the flag for commercial advertis-
ing purposes"); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 13, § 1325 (1984). Although California does not specifi-
cally call advertising with the flag an offense, the California statute exempts from prosecution
certain uses only if "not connected with any advertisement." See CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE
§ 615 (West 1988).
259. People v. Picking, 263 A.D. 366, 366, 33 N.Y.S.2d 317, 317-18 (1942) (conviction for
use of flag for advertising purposes on commercial automobile), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 644, 42
N.E.2d 741 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 632 (1942).
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be unlawful for an advertisement to depict Betsy Ross sewing the flag. 260
Use of the flag on merchandise or its packaging is specifically out-
lawed by criminal statutes in most states.261 In 1907, the Supreme Court
in Halter v. Nebraska 262 upheld the validity of laws prohibiting use of the
flag "for purposes of trade and traffic" because such purposes were
"wholly foreign to that [purpose] for which it was provided by the Na-
tion. '2 63 The Court held that such use "tends to degrade and cheapen
the flag in the estimation of the people, as well as to defeat the object of
maintaining it as an emblem of National power and National honor" and
may thus be criminally punished. 2
In Halter, the defendants were properly convicted because they had
"unlawfully exposed to public view, sold, exposed for sale, and had in
their possession a bottle of beer, upon which was printed and painted a
representation of the flag of the United States."265Johnson does nothing
to overturn these interpretations of law. To the contrary, in Johnson the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Halter.266
Perhaps the most crass misuse of the flag for advertising purposes
was committed by the national Republican Party. Even as President
Bush denounced the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson,2 67 the national
Republican Party mailed an advertisement promoting the "MEMBER-
SHIP BENEFITS FOR GEORGE BUSH'S REPUBLICAN PRESI-
DENTIAL TASK FORCE.' 26 It featured prominent photographs of
the flag and promised that if the reader would send the national Republi-
can Party enough cash, Republican Senator Don Nickles from
Oklahoma would, at the President's request, send the reader a specially
"dedicated" flag.2 69 Thus, even the President has been involved in ex-
260. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. Tex. No. 0-2520 at 231 (1940).
261. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-8(a) (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.40.2 (West
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-215 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646:1 (III) (1986).
262. 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
263. Id. at 42.
264. Id.
265. Halter, 205 U.S. at 38.
266. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2545 n.10 (affirming Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907)).
The Court stated that [its decision] is consistent with Halter because "that case involved purely
commercial rather than political speech." Id.
267. See Rennert, Bush Predicts Passage of Flag-Burning Ban, Sacramento Bee, July 1,
1989, at Al, col. 1.
268. Letter from Republican Presidential Task Force to Eric A. Isaacson (July 19, 1989)
(on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
269. Id. A glossy flyer explained:
President Bush has commissioned Senator Don Nickles to dedicate this unique full-
size American flag to you as a symbol of your special love for America at an official
ceremony in the rotunda of our nation's Capitol Building. This flag is a replica of the
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ploitation of our flag in direct mail advertising. Additionally, Barbara
Bush has appeared in public with the flag emblazoned upon her handker-
chief or scarf.27° Those actions are technically violations of the Flag
Code,271 and in several jurisdictions would amount to unlawful desecra-
tions.272 However, it is highly improbable that the President or the First
Lady will be sent to jail, even if the proposed amendment is adopted.
Even the United States Postal Service, an "independent executive
agency" of the United States Government, desecrates the flag. Accord-
ing to the Flag Code, the flag should never be "printed or otherwise im-
pressed on anything that is designed for temporary use and discard.
273
The Postal Service, however, continues to place our nation's holiest sym-
bol on millions of postage stamps. Stamps sold will be affixed to enve-
lopes that will be exposed to dirt and soiling in the mails and that, for the
most part, will be discarded.274
Additionally, the Postal Service physically defiles the flag by defac-
ing its image as it appears on those stamps. By law, "the flag should
never have placed upon it, nor on any part of it, nor attached to it any
one presented to Ronald Reagan upon his stepping down from the Presidency of the
United States.
The additional benefits to be obtained for contributing a patriotic $120 include: (1) "The
President's Medal of Merit ... awarded exclusively to Charter Members of George Bush's
Task Force"; (2) a lapel pin "to signal your special relationship with President Bush"; (3) an
embossed membership card; (4) inscription "on the President's Honor Roll" to be "archived
with his official Task Force Papers and kept on permanent display at the new world-wide
headquarters of the Task Force, the Ronald Reagan Republican Center ... in Washington,
D.C."; (5) "THE NEW FORCE," which "goes only to Task Force members and will help you
tell friends and neighbors the truth about major events"; (6) special personal letters from Presi-
dent Bush and Task Force Chairman Senator Don Nickles. Id.
270. The ABA and the Flag, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1989, at A16, col. 1. President Bush
apparently thinks a different standard applies for Republicans. For instance, Barbara Bush
wore a flag over her shoulder at George Bush's inauguration. Debate overflag burning rages
on, UPI, July 3, 1989. In addition, Mrs. Bush has been seen wearing a scarf or kerchief made
from the flag. The ABA and the Flag, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1989, at A16, col. 1; House Opens
Hearings on Protecting the Flag, Wash. Post, July 14, 1989, at A7, col. 1.
271. See 36 U.S.C. § 176(d) (1982).
272. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 460 Pa. 112, 118-19, 331 A.2d 444, 446-47 (1975) (under
narrow construction of Pennsylvania statute, wearing flag is permitted).
273. 36 U.S.C. § 176(i) (1982).
274. In his Texas v. Johnson dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: "The flag has appeared
as the principal symbol on approximately 33 United States postal stamps and in the design of
at least 43 more, more times than any other symbol." 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2551 (1989) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States Postal Service, Definitive Mint Set 15 (1988)).
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that "[b]oth Congress and the States have enacted nu-
merous laws regulating misuse of the American flag." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The
Chief Justice then discusses both criminal provisions and section 176's respect for the flag
requirement, yet does not clearly state the conclusion that placing the flag on stamps is unlaw-
ful. Id. at 2551-55.
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mark." '275 Nonetheless, the Postal Service smears the flag with indelible
ink when it postmarks the mail.
C. Unprecedented Prosecutorial Discretion
Under current law, a citizen who is selected for prosecution pursu-
ant to a valid statute may challenge the action if he or she can demon-
strate that selection for prosecution was based solely on their exercise of
first amendment rights.276 Defendants are permitted to use statistical ev-
idence that proves that unlawful conduct generally goes unpunished un-
less the conduct was committed by vocal opponents of the
government.2 77 Since Gregory Johnson was selected for prosecution on
this basis, his conviction was voided. 78 Few defendants, however, man-
age to make the necessary showing that "others are generally not prose-
cuted for the same conduct" and that "[t]he decision to prosecute...
was based upon impermissible grounds such as... the exercise of consti-
tutional rights.
'2 79
The President, however, is not likely to urge prosecution of republi-
can politicians who use the flag in their political advertising, even though
they should know that according to common decency and prevailing law
"[t]he flag should never be used for advertising purposes in any manner
whatsoever... "280 Nor is it likely that the President will urge federal
prosecution of large corporations or mainstream publications that dese-
crate the flag. State authorities also show little desire to pursue such
prosecutions.
Even-handed enforcement, without regard to political viewpoint, is
allowed under Texas v. Johnson.281 The proposed amendment, on the
275. 36 U.S.C. § 176(g) (1982).
276. See United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Choate, 619 F.2d 21, 23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980); United States v. Scott,
521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); United States v. Ber-
rios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.
1972).
277. Wilson, 639 F.2d at 505; Steele, 461 F.2d at 1151-52.
278. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548 (1989).
279. Wilson, 639 F.2d at 503. The Ninth Circuit may be the nation's busiest and most
liberal federal appellate tribunal. Nonetheless, by 1981. there was only one case in which a
defendant had prevailed in a claim of selective prosecution. Id. at 505 (citing United States v.
Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972)). In flag-desecration cases, the defense of discriminatory
prosecution has failed where "there is no evidence of actual discrimination or selective enforce-
ment." Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969
(1972).
280. 36 U.S.C. § 176(i) (1982).
281. 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2547 (1989). Although in Smith v. Goguen the Court invalidated a
conviction under vague provisions outlawing contemptuous treatment of the flag, it recon-
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other hand, could place unprecedented discretion in the hands of prose-
cutors who will be able to choose their victims on the basis of political
considerations or religious belief. However, neither federal nor state au-
thorities intend to launch an all out attack on desecration. Instead, the
President may encourage application of the law only against unpopular
political minorities.282 Only communists, anarchists, or non-Christian
religious fundamentalists will be hauled off to the federal penitentiary. If
the amendment were adopted, it would enable prosecutors to use the des-
ecration laws as a pretext for political prosecution.
VI. THE FLAG VERSUS RELIGION
The first victims of selective prosecution under the proposed amend-
ment may be religious minorities such as Jehovah's Witnesses.
A. Salute or Desecrate
A salute to the flag involves physical conduct, 283 and the proposed
firmed that "nothing prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what con-
stitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags." 415 U.S. 566, 581-82 (1974).
282. Before our Constitution was graced with a Bill of Rights protecting our religious and
political liberties, a Baptist minister, the Rev. John Leland, wrote to our nation's first Presi-
dent, "[I]f religious liberty is rather insecure in the Constitution, the Administration will cer-
tainly prevent all oppression; for a Washington will preside." See R.A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH
OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791 209 (1955).
283. Federal law provides that the Pledge of Allegiance
should be rendered by standing at attention facing the flag with the right hand over
the heart. When not in uniform men should remove their headdress with their right
hand and hold it at the left shoulder, the hand being over the heart. Persons in
uniform should remain silent, face the flag, and render the military salute.
36 U.S.C. § 172 (1982). Federal law also calls for physical gestures of respect for the flag
during the playing of the National Anthem and during hoisting and lowering of the flag. Id.
§§ 171, 177. See also Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2551 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing).
In Boiling v. Superior Court, Jehovah's Witnesses' children had "refused to repeat the
pledge of allegiance contained in the statute, stating that according to their religious belief, the
repetition of words constituting the pledge, together with accompanying gestures, are acts
which are against their religious convictions." 16 Wash. 2d 373, 375, 133 P.2d 803, 805 (1943)
(emphasis added).
The Supreme Court discussed the dispute over physical aspects of the flag salute in Bar-
nette. 319 U.S. at 627-28 & n.3. See also Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
591 (1940), overruled, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Initially, the -flag salute involved a stiff-arm gesture. The Barnette Court observed that
although the physical manner of the flag salute was altered in response to objections that the
salute was too similar to that of the Nazis "no concession was made to Jehovah's Witnesses."
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627-28. The Court further stated:
The National Headquarters of the United States Flag Association takes the position
that the extension of the right arm in this salute to the flag is not the Nazi-Fascist
salute, "although quite similar to it. In the Pledge to the Flag the right arm is ex-
tended and raised, palm UPWARD, whereas the Nazis extend the arm practically
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amendment opens the way for contentions that refusal to salute the flag
is physical disrespect or desecration. Jehovah's Witnesses will not salute
the flag because of their interpretation of the Second Commandment:
"Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is
in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them
nor serve them. ' 284 Jehovah's Witnesses manifestly regard the flag as a
profane and unholy image;285 their interpretation of the Bible denies the
flag's sacred status. Their conduct is thus a "desecration" of the flag in
the strictest and purest sense of the word: they treat the flag as though it
were not sacred. 86
Only a few decades ago, Jehovah's Witnesses were prosecuted for
violating flag salute laws, or even denouncing them. West Virginia, for
example, expelled several Jehovah's Witness children from a public
school for refusing to salute the flag, and then prosecuted their parents
for causing juvenile delinquency.28 7  Mississippi and Arkansas prose-
cuted and convicted Jehovah's Witnesses as criminals for speaking their
beliefs, because their utterances of faith "tend[ed] to create an attitude of
stubborn refusal to salute, honor, or respect the flag or government of the
United States., 288 In the state of Washington, the government took Je-
straight to the front (the finger tips being about even with the eyes), palm DOWN-
WARD, and the Fascists do the same except they raise the arm slightly higher."
Id. at 628 n.3. (quoting J.A. Moss, THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND
SYMBOLISM 108 (1914)).
Clearly, the physical salute to the flag was, and continues to be, a very important
consideration.
284. Exodus 20:4-5 (King James).
285. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943).
286. The beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses are, of course, a non-physical desecration of the
flag. As such, these beliefs would not be criminal under the proposed amendment. But, if
intent to desecrate the flag is not an element of the offense, Jehovah Witnesses' beliefs will be
utterly irrelevant at trial unless intentional refusal to salute the flag becomes one form of dese-
cration.
If the first amendment is not a defense to prosecution, sincere religious belief is not either.
The holding in Barnette, is based on the speech clause of the first amendment, rather than the
Free Exercise Clause. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-35.
It is well established that the free exercise of religion is not a defense to a charge of
criminal conduct. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). In addition,
even if some exception to this rule can be created, it is clear that nothing in the proposed
amendment distinguishes between speech concerns and religion concerns under the first
amendment. See supra note 159 and accompanying text for the contents of the proposed
amendment.
287. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.
288. See Taylor v. State, 194 Miss. 1, 11 So. 2d 663, 667 (1942), rev'd, 319 U.S. 583 (1943);
Cummings v. State, 194 Miss. 59, 11 So. 2d 683 (1942), rev'd, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); Benoit v.
State, 194 Miss. 74, 11 So. 2d 689 (1942), rev'd, 319 U.S. 583 (1943). The Supreme Court of
Arkansas, too, held that a Jehovah's Witness' explanation of his refusal to salute the flag was a
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hovah's Witness children away from their parents under the provisions of
flag-salute laws, and placed the children in state custody because the chil-
dren "refused to repeat the pledge of allegiance contained in the statute,
stating that according to their religious belief, the repetition of words
constituting the pledge, together with accompanying gestures, are acts
which violate their religious convictions."2"9
Only the first amendment, as interpreted by the courts, put an end
to such practices. In the landmark opinion West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,290 the United States Supreme Court held that the
first amendment protected Jehovah's Witnesses persecuted under the
flag-salute laws of the state of West Virginia. That same year the
Supreme Court of Washington upheld the first amendment liberties of
Jehovah's Witnesses against the command of the flag-salute laws.291 The
United States Supreme Court reversed convictions of Mississippi's Jeho-
vah's Witnesses.292
During his campaign for the Presidency, George Bush condemned
criminal desecration: "It doesn't mean anything to me. It is only a rag." See Johnson v. State,
204 Ark. 476, 477, 163 S.W.2d 153, 154 (1942). The supreme courts of neither state treated
the failure to salute as itself unlawful. Cummings, 194 Miss. at 70, 11 So. 2d at 684; Johnson,
204 Ark. at 479, 163 S.W.2d at 154. Other cases involving prosecutions of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses include: Trent v. Hunt, 39 F. Supp. 373 (S.D. Ind. 1941), aff'd mem., 314 U.S. 573
(1941); Miller v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 428, 133 P.2d 223 (1943); Zimmerman v. State, 77
Okla. Crim. 266, 141 P.2d 123 (1943); Pendley v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 259, 141 P.2d 118
(1943); Carter-Mort v. State, 77 Okla. Crim. 269, 141 P.2d 122 (1943).
289. State ex rel. Boiling v. Superior Court, 16 Wash. 2d 373, 375, 133 P.2d 803, 804-05
(1943).
290. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Barnette overruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, which had
earlier upheld the power of the State of Pennsylvania to expel Jehovah's Witness children from
school when they refused to salute the flag. 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940).
291. Boiling, 16 Wash. 2d at 387-88, 133 P.2d at 809-10. Observing that "[t]he constitu-
tional guarantees of freedom of religious belief and of speech are of vital importance to the
maintenance of our system of government," the court held that Jehovah's Witness children
by standing respectfully at attention during the exercises comprising the salute to the
flag, will show due respect to the national standard during the ceremony, and the fact
that, because of their conscientious scruples, they are excused from doing that which
the law provides shall be done, and which others cheerfully do, should impress not
only those who claim the privilege of following their religious convictions, but all
others, with the fact that the flag protects each citizen, and that the government of
which it is the symbol guarantees to all religious liberty.
Id. at 381, 387, 133 P.2d at 807, 809-10. Notably, although the Washington Supreme Court
exempted Jehovah's Witnesses from being required to recite the pledge of allegiance, it still
required them to show respect for what they regarded as a profane symbol, by commanding
them to stand at attention before it, under penalty of law. Id. at 387, 133 P.2d at 809. ("Our
decision in this case must not be considered as authority for tolerating the least disrespect for
the flag which is the symbol of our liberty .... [D]isrespect to the flag constitutes an offense
against our laws."). Id.
292. See Cummings v. State, 194 Miss. 59, 11 So. 2d 683 (1942), rev'd, Taylor v. Missis-
sippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
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his opponent, Michael S. Dukakis, for supporting the Court's decision in
Barnette. 93 In the presidential campaign of 1988, Mr. Bush suggested
that because Mr. Dukakis respected the Barnette precedent, he was unfit
to be President. 94 Once again, President Bush is confronted with Bar-
nette since that decision was the basis of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals' opinion which ordered Gregory Johnson's release.295 In Texas
v. Johnson,296 the Supreme Court affirmed that opinion, relying again on
Barnette.297
If President Bush eventually secures ratification of the proposed
amendment, the amendment could be interpreted as overruling Barnette
and Johnson, thereby removing constitutional objections to prosecution
of religious minorities and others who refuse to salute the flag. Although
the proposed amendment focuses on physical actions, the government
could not force these individuals to utter the words of the pledge of alle-
giance. This is a small consolation to citizens prosecuted for following
their consciences and religious convictions.
B. No Exemption for Religion
Judges hearing cases under the proposed amendment might try to
soften its impact by implying a religion-based exemption under the pro-
posed amendment. However, if the proposed amendment is interpreted
as removing first amendment objections to prosecution for physical dese-
cration of the flag, no judge, in good faith could grant the Jehovah's
Witnesses, or any other non-flag-saluting religious group, a special
exemption.
One can imagine the public outrage if the courts did grant an ex-
293. Barnette was at the root of the great "Pledge of Allegiance" issue which helped propel
George Bush into the White House. When the Massachusetts Legislature proposed a measure
requiring teachers to lead all students in a flag salute, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, upon certification of the question to it, declared the measure to be unconstitutional
under Barnette. Opinions of the Justices to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 879, 363 N.E.2d 251,
254-55 (1977). Governor Dukakis vetoed the measure, explaininj "my oath of office requires
me to uphold the Constitution of the United States. I cannot sign any bill that violates the
Constitution, as the bill has been declared to do." Why Dukakis Deep-sixed the Pledge of
Allegiance, L.A. Herald Examiner, June 22, 1988, at A13, col. 1.
294. See Stengel, Taking the Pledge, TIME, Sept. 5, 1988, at 14; Pledge Issue Reveals Rift in
America's View of Itself, L.A. Times, Oct. 3, 1988, Part 2, at 5, col. 1.
295. See Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex. 1988) (citing West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). But see Monroe v. State
Court, 739 F.2d 568, 574 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[T]here is no significant difference between Bar-
nette, in which the government sought to compel the expression of respect toward the flag and
this case, in which the government seeks to prevent the expression of disrespect.").
296. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
297. Id. at 2545 (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
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emption for conduct related to religious beliefs. For example, under the
exemption the court would be compelled to jail political dissidents who
desecrate the flag but allow Shiite Islamic fundamentalists who desecrate
the flag for the greater glory of Allah to go free. The proposed amend-
ment contains no such distinctions. Under the proposed amendment,
Shiite Islamic fundamentalists and Jehovah's Witnesses have no special
status based upon religion.298
The Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment does not grant reli-
gious minorities a special license to violate criminal laws.2 99 The Estab-
lishment Clause of the first amendment 300 prohibits legal distinctions
based upon religious doctrine a.3 1  Any court-made distinction between
Jehovah's Witnesses and Shiites would be unconstitutional under the Es-
tablishment Clause. Indeed, any court-made distinction created to per-
mit religious desecration of the flag may well be unconstitutional.
VII. BURNING THE FLAG
Even if the proposed constitutional amendment is adopted, political
activists like Gregory Johnson could easily burn the flag to denounce our
country and its ideals, and could do so with complete legal impunity.
Federal law requires that "[w]hen [the flag] is in such condition that it is
no longer a fitting emblem for display, it should be destroyed in a digni-
fied way, preferably by burning.
' 30 2
If the flag has become torn or soiled, it cannot be tossed in the gar-
bage, or run through the wash cycle; it should be burned. 30 3 Any other
disposition would desecrate the flag through disrespectful conduct.
Under the proposed amendment, a person wanting to burn the flag
as a protest need only burn a soiled or torn flag. That individual cannot
be found guilty of desecration for burning the flag because the person has
a duty to burn it under the Flag Code. 3 4 Furthermore, "pure speech,"
298. See supra note 159.
299. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Wisconsin v. Yoder, which prohib-
ited application to the Amish of a Wisconsin law penalizing parents who refused to send their
children to school beyond the eighth grade, created a very limited exception to this doctrine.
406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
300. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
301. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (neither state nor federal govern-
ment "can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another").
302. 36 U.S.C. § 176(k) (1982); see also Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543 (1989); Op.
Att'y Gen. Fla. 059-275 (1959).
303. See 36 U.S.C. § 176(k) (1982).
304. Id.
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even if accompanied by physical desecration, is protected. °5 This illus-
trates that but for a protestor's words and contemptuous state of mind,
the protester's actions are identical to those of the American Legion's
members when they respectfully "retire" flags by burning them, as they
regularly do.3 °6
Protesters can easily obtain flags that need to be burned °.3 7 For ex-
ample, republican Congressman Chuck Douglas recently obtained a
soiled flag for a televised publicity stunt in the District of Columbia
designed to embarrass democrats who were not enthusiastic supporters
of the proposed amendment.30 8 Although it is a crime in the District of
Columbia to "in any manner, for public exhibition or display" to place
any mark on the flag, or to "expose or cause to be exposed to public
view" a flag bearing any mark "of any nature,' 30 9 because of the fifth
amendment's protection against self-incrimination, we will never be able
to demand answers from Representative Douglas regarding who soiled
the flag, or why. It is enough to observe that, once he obtained the soiled
flag, Congressman Douglas committed a criminal desecration-he pub-
licly displayed the flag without burning it.
305. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590-94 (1969) (appellant saying, "We don't need
no damn flag" to bystanders); see also People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 925-26, 78
Cal. Rptr. 853, 854 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 371 (1970).
306. See Nation Shows Its Love of Flag on 4th of July, L.A. Times, July 5, 1989, Part I, at
13, col. 1. The Attorney General of Florida has advised that flags no longer fit for display may
be burned either privately or in public. See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 059-275 (1959). In his dissent
in Johnson, Justice Stevens suggested that the Legionnaires should be prosecuted:
The concept of "desecration" does not turn on the substance of the message the actor
intends to convey, but rather on whether those who view the act will take serious
offense. Accordingly, one intending to convey a message of respect for the flag by
burning it in a public square might nonetheless be guilty of desecration if he knows
that others-perhaps simply because they misperceive the intended message-will be
seriously offended. Indeed, even if the actor knows that all possible witnesses will
understand that he intends to send a message of respect, he might still be guilty of
desecration if he also knows that his understanding does not lessen the offense taken
by some of those witnesses.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' interpretation of "dese-
cration" ignores the word's fundamental meaning, which focuses attention on improper con-
duct toward the flag not on mistaken emotional reactions. Justice Stevens has misconstrued
the basic legal principle that the offense of desecration does not depend upon intent to dese-
crate. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of "desecration".
307. Gregory Johnson himself is pictured in a national news magazine holding such a flag.
See NEWSWEEK, July, 1989, at 20. In the photograph, the flag is visibly tattered. Id. Under
the Flag Code, Mr. Johnson had a duty to burn it. See 36 U.S.C. § 176(k) (1982).
308. See House Judiciary Panel Passes Flag Bill in Heated Debate, L.A. Daily J., July 28,
1989, § 1, at 6, col. 2. Douglas "protested what he suggested were Dem6cratic strong-arm
tactics with props for the television cameras, including a gag over his mouth and a pair of flags,
one dirty and one clean." Id.
309. 4 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
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In many states a would-be protester may tear or soil the flag pri-
vately and then burn it publicly without subjecting himself or herself to
criminal liability.31 Some state desecration statutes focus on public des-
ecration only.3 1I A few states appear to outlaw desecration whether or
not the desecration is committed in public.
31 2
Even where the law prohibits private desecration, it will be easy to
obtain flags that need to be burned. Congressman Douglas apparently
had no problem acquiring a soiled flag. One could just go to a depart-
ment store, and buy a T-shirt with the flag on it.
Assuming passage of the proposed amendment would stop stores,
manufacturers, advertisers, and all others from illegally depicting the
flag, it would be virtually impossible to obtain a conviction for flag burn-
ing under laws enacted pursuant to the proposed amendment. There
would be an almost perfect defense to the charge: flags often become
faded, soiled or torn, without any wrongdoing.
Not surprisingly, most desecration prosecutions do not involve the
burning of a flag. For the most part, they involve placing a mark on a
flag,3 13 placing articles on a flag, 3 14 tearing a flag,315 using a flag for ad-
vertising purposes,316 wearing a flag as an article of clothing, 31 7 speaking
310. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-51-207 (4) (1987); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 614
(West 1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-11-204 (1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264 § 5
(West 1970 & Supp. 1989).
311. See statutes cited supra note 207.
312. See statutes cited supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., State v. Cline, 113 N.H. 245, 246, 305 A.2d 673, 674 (1973) (peace symbol on
flag), aff'd, 502 F.2d 789 (Ist Cir. 1974); People v. Verch, 63 Misc. 2d 477, 478, 311 N.Y.S.2d
637, 638 (1970) (paint on flag); State v. Liska, 26 Ohio Misc. 9, 18, 268 N.E.2d 824, 830 (1970)
(peace symbol on flag), rev'd, 32 Ohio App. 2d 317, 291 N.E.2d 498 (1971).
314. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Bunch, 26 Ohio Misc. 161, 268 N.E.2d 831 (1970), aff'd, 32
Ohio App. 2d 161, 288 N.E.2d 854 (1971) ("He was charged and convicted of defiling the flag
by using it as a rug to display his personal property.").
315. See, e.g., Joyce v. United States, 259 A.2d 363 (D.C. 1969), aff'd, 454 F.2d 971, 978-79
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972); Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 174, 179, 154
S.E.2d 246, 250 (1967), rev'd mem. sub. nom. Anderson v. Georgia, 390 U.S. 206 (1968).
316. See, e.g., Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) (use of flag for advertising purposes
on beer bottles); People v. Picking, 263 A.D. 366, 366, 33 N.Y.S.2d 317, 317-18 (1942) ("the
car on which appeared at six different places the defendants' name, emblem and appeal to
'Travel America' constituted one advertisement to which the flag was affixed in violation of the
statute."), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 644, 42 N.E.2d 741 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 632 (1942).
317. See, e.g., People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969) (wearing
vest incorporating flag), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 371 (1970); State v. Waterman, 190
N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 1971) (wearing flag as "poncho"); Commonwealth v. Goguen, 361 Mass.
846, 279 N.E.2d 666 (1972) (wearing flag sewn to trousers), rev'd, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); State v.
Royal, 113 N.H. 224, 225, 305 A.2d 676, 680-81 (1973) (wearing flag on jacket and trousers);
Case v. State, 489 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (defendant "had the flag wrapped
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ill of the flag,31 or otherwise abusing a flag.3 19
Cases involving convictions for flag burning generally do not men-
tion the fact that the flag should be burned if soiled or torn. In many of
these cases it is apparent that the flag did not need to be burned. In
Texas v. Johnson,32° for example, Gregory Johnson burned a flag that
flew above a bank just moments before.321 Since the flag was still fit for
public display it was not a legitimate candidate for burning.
322
In other cases, intent is treated as a crucial element of the desecra-
tion offense.323 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that
someone who possessed an evil intent may be convicted of desecration
even if burning was required because the flag was soiled or torn. 324 How-
ever, such a holding is contrary to the general rule that intent is irrele-
vant to desecration, 325 and conflicts with the proposed amendment's
focus on physical desecration.326 The proposed amendment's terms do
not permit conviction on the basis of evil thought alone. Furthermore,
even when evil thought is coupled with a flag burning, no conviction can
result if the burning was an objectively lawful act.
Under the proposed amendment, the President could only stand by
helplessly, as Old Glory goes up in flames to the jeers of those like Greg-
ory Johnson. If Congress is going to amend the Constitution, Congress
should draft something more effective than the proposed amendment.
VIII. POSSIBLE LIMITS ON CONGRESS' AMENDMENT POWER
When Congress proposes an amendment to the Constitution the
process is a particularly powerful exercise of Congress' law-making au-
around his body"); State v. Claxton, 7 Wash. App. 598, 599, 501 P.2d 192, 193 (1972) (wear-
ing flag on trousers).
318. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 204 Ark. 476, 477-78, 163 S.W.2d 153, 154 (1942) (defend-
ant refused to salute flag and told crowd of people flag was only "rag").
319. See, e.g., State v. Schlueter, 127 N.J.L. 496, 497, 23 A.2d 249, 250 (1941) (throwing
flag on ground); State v. Sinniger, 6 Or. App. 145, 147, 486 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (1971) (display-
ing flag on truck seat); Van Slyke v. State, 489 S.W.2d 590, 591-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)
(defendant blew his nose in flag and publicly masturbated with it).
320. 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989).
321. Id.
322. 36 U.S.C. § 176(k) (1982). The Johnson court noted that "Federal law designates
burning as the preferred means of disposing of a flag 'when it is in such condition that it is no
longer a fitting emblem for display.'" Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
323. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morgan, 222 Pa. Super. 511, 513, 295 A.2d 183, 184
(1972) (whether intent is crucial element is matter of statutory construction which must be
determined in light of statute's language and purpose).
324. United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 100 (1972).
325. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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thority. When Congressional power appears to threaten the established
guarantees of the first amendment, we may search for limits on this
power inherent in 'the Constitution itself. By its own terms the first
amendment is an exceptional and broad withdrawal of power from Con-
gress. Read literally, the language "Congress shall make no law" limits
the process by which an amendment can be proposed under article V.
The history of the first amendment reflects the Framers' direct intent to
withdraw power from Congress and to prevent Congress from acting
within the broad field covered by the first amendment. Although amend-
ments are not mere statutory "law," the meaning of law in first amend-
ment jurisprudence may be broad enough to reach Congress' law-making
authority when the substance of a proposed amendment abridges the
freedom of speech.
The Constitution contains rules for adopting amendments, and lim-
its the power of Congress and the states to make some kinds of laws. 27
In particular, the Constitution affords four alternative procedures for
adopting amendments, all but one of which involve the law-making pow-
ers of Congress or state legislatures.328 At the same time, the first
amendment unambiguously commands, "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech," '329 which also applies to the states by
the fourteenth amendment.330 The Supreme Court's holding in Texas v.
Johnson that the first amendment may protect a defendant charged with
desecrating the flag331 is founded on the first amendment's freedom of
speech, so that an amendment overturning Texas v. Johnson would be a
law abridging the freedom of speech. If such an amendment were pro-
posed by Congress or ratified by state legislatures, the courts might have
been compelled by the first amendment's simple words to hold it invalid.
The constitutional limits on the amendment power must be respected.
3 32
327. U.S. CONST. art. V.
328. See id.
329. Id. amend. I.
330. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). To the extent that legislative
ratification is not an act of state legislative power but of a federal power exercised by Congress,
as suggested in Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1920), reference to the fourteenth
amendment need not be made: The first amendment's limitation on federal power applies
directly.
331. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (1989).
332. U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V of the Constitution states:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amend-
ments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratifica-
tion may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be
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A. The Amendment Power Generally
The Constitution imposes absolute limitations on both the proce-
dures for adopting amendments and the substance of permissible amend-
ments. Two of the substantive limitations on the permissible content of
amendments appear in article V.333 One of those limitations prohibits
any alteration to the clauses in article I which deal with the slave trade
and with direct taxation.3 34 The other limitation prohibits any amend-
ment from depriving a state of equal suffrage in the Senate without the
state's consent. 33' Article V allows only four possible procedures for
amending the Constitution. The four procedures are: (1) approval by
two-thirds of each house of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of
the state legislatures; (2) approval by two-thirds of each house and ratifi-
cation by constitutional conventions in three-fourths of the states; (3) ap-
proval by a national constitutional convention and ratification by three-
fourths of the state legislatures; and (4) approval by a national constitu-
tional convention and ratification by constitutional conventions in three-
fourths of the states.336
In all of these procedures but the fourth, an amendment is ratified
by the federal or state governments acting as sovereign legislatures.337
Under the fourth procedure, the people of the United States may amend
the Constitution, 338 and the state and federal legislatures do not partici-
pate in ratifying the amendment. If Congress' and the states' power to
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner
affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
See also L. BERNHARDT, THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1942); Dellin-
ger, Amending Process, in L. LEVY, K. KARST, & D. MAHONEY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 47-49 (1986).
333. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
334. Id.
335. See id. See also United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341
U.S. 494 (1951).
336. U.S. CONT. art. V.
337. Id. It is idle to argue that Congress does not participate in making an amendment law
because article V states that Congress shall "propose" an amendment and that only ratification
makes it law. Id. Article V requires the so-called "proposal" to be approved by "two thirds of
both Houses." Id. If only a simple majority in each House "proposed" a constitutional
amendment it would never become law, even if "ratified" in every state. Id.
When Congress "proposes" an amendment it takes a substantive legislative step in mak-
ing constitutional law. The fact that the act is not by itself sufficient to make an amendment
constitutional law does not change its character. Also, Congress and the states, together, can
make constitutional law, subject only to explicit limitations imposed by the Constitution. Id.
It is clear that the exercise of the amendment power does involve the law-making capacity of
Congress and the state legislatures.
338. Id.
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make law abridging the freedom of speech is limited by the first amend-
ment's literal terms, approval by a national constitutional convention and
ratification by the voters of the states in constitutional convention339 may
be the only permissible method of restricting first amendment rights.
Any proposed amendment that does not comply with the substan-
tive and procedural provisions of article V is void. Thus, a proposed
amendment which is not ratified in three-fourths of the states will fail to
become part of the Constitution.34 Similarly, an amendment is void if it
339. See U.S. CONST. art. V. A constitutional "convention is a separate, independent body
ultimately not controllable" by either Congress or the state legislatures. Gunther, The Con ven-
tion Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1979); see also
Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189 (1972); Del-
linger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623
(1979). But see Van Alstyne, Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited Conven-
tions Only?-A Letter to a Colleague, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1305-06 (1978) (suggesting that
article V permits Congress and state legislatures, acting jointly, to control content of any
amendments to be proposed by constitutional convention).
Article V of the Constitution, which confers limited powers for amending fundamental
law, went through several drafts and was the subject of considerable debate between the Fram-
ers. See Dellinger, supra at 1624-30. Its ultimate form reflects the Framers' distrust of both
Congress and the state legislatures. Id. at 1626-30. They rejected proposals that would have
vested the amendment power in either the Congress or the state legislatures, or in both of them
together. Id. at 1625-26. The best concise review of article V's history is found in Dellinger,
supra.
340. See U.S. CONST. art. V. See also Harris v. Donges, 1 T.L.R. 1245 (S. Afr. Sup. Ct.
1952); L. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97
HARV. L. REV. 433, 433 (1983).
The argument that the structure of a constitution may imply limits on a legislature's
amendment power has never been sustaihed in the history of American jurisprudence. How-
ever, other constitutional systems have recognized such a limitation.
In Harris v. Donges, the Supreme Court of South Africa struck down as unconstitutional a
racist attempt to amend a so-called "entrenched" section of its constitution without meeting
the necessary procedural requirements. I T.L.R. at 1245. The constitutional provision pro-
hibited any Parliamentary law to
disqualify any person... in the province of the Cape of Good Hope who, under the
laws existing in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope at the establishment of the
Union, is or may become capable of being registered as a voter from being so regis-
tered in the province of the Cape of Good Hope by reason of his race or colour only
... unless the Bill embodying such disqualification or alteration be passed by both
Houses of Parliament sitting together, and a the third reading be agreed to by not less
than two-thirds of the total number of members of both Houses.
Id. at 1246-47.
Another provision authorized constitutional amendments by Parliament, but provided a
purported amendment to the foregoing provision would be invalid "unless the Bill embodying
such repeal or alteration shall be passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting together, and at
the third reading be agreed to by not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of
both Houses." Id. at 1247. Parliament, sitting bicamerally, and with bare majorities, pur-
ported to provide for separate representation of "European" and "non-European" voters. Id.
at 1246. The Supreme Court of South Africa voided this attempt to change the law without
the required two-thirds vote of Parliament sitting unicamerally. Id. at 1266.
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purports to deprive any state of its equal suffrage in the Senate without
its consent.3 41 An amendment abridging the freedom of speech may also
be void if it is proposed by Congress and ratified by state legislatures
rather than by the people in a Constitutional Convention.
B. The First Amendment May Be a Special Case Where the
Amendment Power Is Limited
A literal interpretation of the first amendment's broad withdrawal of
power from Congress to reach freedom of speech, a fundamental liberty,
would limit Congress' amendment power. 342 By choosing the words
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech," '343 the
Framers may have intended to foreclose Congress from making any al-
terations to the basic law or the constitutional law designed to abridge
the freedom of speech. Unquestionably, the Constitution is our funda-
mental law. In article VI, the Constitution declares itself "the supreme
Law of the Land," 3" and the Framers referred to the Constitution as
law.345 Moreover, because the first amendment's limitation on the power
to make law is fully applicable to the state governments through the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.346 Thus, neither Congress
nor the state legislatures may circumvent the amendment process to pass
any constitutional amendment to abridge the freedom of speech.
The Framers of our Constitution, working in Philadelphia during
the summer and fall of 1787, did not include a bill of rights because they
believed that it was unnecessary.347 Rather, the Framers believed that
the government they were creating would lack the power to legislate re-
341. See U.S. CONST. art V. See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw, 70-76 (1961).
The United States Supreme Court has held that practical details of the amendment proce-
dure are "political questions" not appropriate for judicial review if the constitutional text does
not lay down a clear rule. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). However, the Court
has never hesitated to decide questions relating to the permissible substantive content of an
amendment. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S.
350 (1920); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 378 (1798).
342. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
343. Id. (emphasis added).
344. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
345. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("A
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by judges, as a fundamental law.").
346. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925). To the extent that legislative ratification is not an act of state legislative power but of a
federal power exercised at the discretion of Congress, as suggested in Hawke v. Smith, refer-
ence to the fourteenth amendment need not be made, because the first ainendment's limitation
on power applies directly. 253 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1920).
347. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 630, 640
(Ohio Univ. Press 1966).
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garding speech, the press, or religion since the Constitution conferred no
power to do SO.
348
The states desired more definite limitations. Several state ratifying
conventions recommended specific amendments to the Constitution; the
North Carolina representative proposed amendments but refused to rat-
ify the Constitution until a bill of rights was adopted.349 Shortly after the
Constitution was ratified, a bill of rights was drafted and proposed by the
first Congress. 35  In this historical context, the first amendment of the
Bill of Rights was enacted to place certain fundamental liberties beyond
the law-making powers of Congress.351
Most provisions in the Bill of Rights do not speak directly to the
power to make law but affirm rights of the people that are to be
respected. For example, the second amendment advises that "the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. ' 352 The
fourth amendment similarly provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. '35 3 The seventh amendment
states that "in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
348. The state delegations attending the convention unanimously rejected the notion of a
Bill of Rights on September 12, 1787. J., MADISON, supra note 359, at 630. When Messrs.
Pinckney and Gerry proposed insertion of a declaration "that the liberty of the Press should be
inviolably observed," Mr. Sherman retorted, "It is unnecessary. The power of Congress does
not extend to the Press." Id. at 640. With that said the proposal was rejected. Id. at 640.
Promoting the proposed Constitution as 'Publius' in The Federalist Papers, Alexander
Hamilton defended these decisions. He argued, "[F]or why declare that things shall not be
done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the
press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?"
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Mr. Pinckney explained why the Bill of Rights had been rejected when he defended the
Constitution before the South Carolina House of Representatives on January 18, 1788:
[W]e had no bill of rights inserted in our Constitution; for, as we might perhaps have
omitted the enumeration of some of our rights, it might hereafter be said we had
delegated to the general government a power to take away such of our rights as we
had not enumerated; but by delegating express powers, we certainly reserve to our-
selves every power and right not mentioned in the Constitution.
3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 app. A, CLXXIII at
256 (1911); see also id. app. A, CXCVIII at 297-98 (Letter of George Washington of April 28,
1788 to LaFayette). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) § 8-
1, at 560 ("[G]overnment as a whole had no power to act outside its rightful jurisdiction to
intrude upon the 'natural rights' reserved to the people within the private domain...").
349. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 444-48 (1789), reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 1159 (1971).
350. See generally R. RUTLAND, supra note 282.
351. U.S. CONST. amend I.
352. Id. amend. II.
353. Id. amend. IV.
BURNING THE FLAG
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." '354
By contrast, the first amendment uses very different language to pre-
serve our most fundamental rights from potential political incursions.
The Speech and Religion clauses do not speak of "rights" at all. Instead,
the first amendment commands:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. 5
Congress shall make no law is the crucial phrase. It is far more re-
strictive than any other limitation contained in the Bill of Rights. No
other provision in the Bill of Rights operates by withdrawing from Con-
gress the power to make any law." 6 Thus, the first amendment is radi-
cally different from the rest of the Bill of Rights; its only analogue may
be found in the absolute disabilities to act imposed by article V.357
The difference in language between the first amendment and the
other provisions of the Bill of Rights was not accidental.35 8 Rather, the
specific terms were the result of careful consideration and revision.
Early drafts addressing religion, speech and the press affirmed these
rights, but did not explicitly withdraw the power to make law.359 James
Madison's first draft, which he read to the House of Representatives on
June 8, 1789, merely declared:
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
354. Id. amend. VII.
355. Id. amend. I (emphasis added).
356. Some provisions of article I, section 9 bear a superficial similarity to the first amend-
ment's deprivation of law making power. The third clause, for example, provides that "no Bill
of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Obviously,
however, an amendment to repeal this clause would not itself be an ex post facto law or bill of
attainder and, thus, is not prohibited. By contrast, any amendment that amputates some por-
tion of the first amendment's liberty for speech is necessarily a law abridging the freedom of
speech.
357. U.S. CONST. art. V.
358. Professor Van Alstyne has pointed out that the other provisions of the Bill of Rights
are framed in much weaker terms. He stated, "It requires no arcane learning to understand
the clear and plain meaning of 'Congress,' 'no law,' 'abridging,' or 'speech.'" W. VAN AL-
STYNE, INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 23 (1984). Edwin Meese advises us
that, "those who framed the Constitution chose their words carefully; they debated at great
length the most minute points. The language they chose meant something." Address by Ed-
win Meese III, A.B.A. (July 19, 1985), reprinted in S. MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE
CONSTITUTION 14 (1986).
359. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 349, at 1026-28.
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established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretext infringed.
The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right
to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the free-
dom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall
be inviolable.
The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assem-
bling and consulting for their common good; nor from applying
to the Legislature by petitions, or remonstrances, for redress of
their grievances.360
Madison made a speech introducing the Bill of Rights. Notes for
that speech indicate that he may have intended to do more: He intended
to "limit and qualify pow[er] by except[ing] from [the] grant [of legisla-
tive power to Congress] cases in wh[ich] it shall not be exercised or
ex[pressed] in a particular manner."' 361 The amendments he proposed,
however, were not yet framed in terms that reflected Congress'
powerlessness to make laws in the area of first amendment protections.
On July 21, 1789, the House sent Madison's draft to a select com-
mittee consisting of one member drawn from each of the eleven states
that had ratified the Constitution and who were represented in the House
of Representatives. 62 Although the draft reaffirmed the importance of
religious and political freedom, this language still did not clearly prohibit
Congress from making law. On August 15, 1789, Madison explained to
the House that under this draft, "Congress should not establish a reli-
gion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to
worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience. 
' 363
Representative Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire objected to
the amendment. 316 A judge whose efforts were crucial to obtaining the
Constitution's ratification in New Hampshire, Livermore advocated the
more restrictive language proposed by New Hampshire's ratifying con-
360. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 349, at 1026.
361. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 389-90 (1904), reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 349, at 1008. These notes indicate that Madison appreciated and drew attention to
the difference between the "natural rights.[sic] retained [such as speech]," and the "positive
rights result[ing]" only from positive governmental recognition, such as "trial by jury." See id.
Madison may wellhave regarded basic "natural rights" to be rights beyond the jurisdiction of
any human government. Thus, matters such as speech and religion would be absolutely be-
yond the power of any government while trial by jury, or the like, would be conditional.
362. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 349, at 1050. North Carolina and Rhode Island had not
yet ratified the Constitution and were not represented. Id.
363. Id. at 1051 (emphasis added).
364. Id. at 1052.
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vention.365 The House Reporter tells us, "He thought it would be better
if it was altered, and made to read in this manner, that Congress shall
make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of con-
science. 3 66 Mr. Livermore's motion "passed in the affirmative, thirty-
one for, and twenty against it." 367 By August 20, 1789, the House had
settled on a text which, on August 24, 1789, it resolved should be added
to the Constitution:
Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall the rights of con-
science be infringed.
The freedom of speech, and of the press, and the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and consult for their com-
mon good, and to apply to the government for redress of griev-
ances, shall not be infringed.368
Thus, through the first amendment, the House proposed to disable
the Congress from acting in relation to religious interests, a precaution it
did not take with regard to the remainder of the Bill of Rights. 369 The
Senate extended Congress' disability reserving to the people the basic
political liberties encompassing freedom of speech, the press, and the
right to assemble and petition for redress of grievances.37 ° The Senate
first rejected the suggestion that the Constitution should recognize free-
dom of speech and press only "in as ample a manner as hath at any time
been secured by the common law."13 71 Subsequently, the Senate adopted
365. Id. at 1089. The Constitution, of course, provides that "[t]he Ratification of the Con-
ventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution." U.S.
CONST. art. VII. In addition to ratifying the Constitution, the New Hampshire convention
recommended twelve amendments to it, the eleventh of which was that "Congress shall make
no Laws touching Religion, or to infringe the rights of Conscience." 2 DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 141-42 reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 349, at 761. Professor Schwartz writes that this was the "first official state recom-
mendation of the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the First Amendment and, most impor-
tant, the first use of the actual prohibitory language with which the First Amendment starts-
a vast improvement, from a legal point of view, in the language of the freedom of religion
guarantee." 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 349, at 758.
366. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 349, at 1089 (emphasis added).
367. Id.
368. HISTORY OF CONGRESS EXHIBITING A CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM MARCH 4, 1789 TO MARCH 3,
1793; EMBRACING THE FIRST TERM OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF GENERAL WASHINGTON
155-56 (Lea & Blanchard 1843), reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 349, at 1122.
369. See 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 349, at 1148.
370. Id. at 1146.
371. Id. at 1148. The Senate also rejected an attempt to establish more extensive jurisdic-
tional limitations that would extend Congress' disability to act far beyond the core rights relat-
ing to religion, speech, the press, and political action:
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the language which, arguably, withholds from Congress any power
whatever to legislate regarding the fundamental political liberties: "That
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for
their common good, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.,
372
On September 9, 1789, the Senate sent its amendments to the
House,3 73 and on September 20, 1789, the House called a committee of
conference with the Senate. 74 On September 23, 1789, Madison made
the conference report to the House, and on the following day Mr. Ells-
It was then moved to add the following clause to the articles of amendment: "That
there are certain natural rights, of which men, when they form a social compact,
cannot deprive or divest their posterity; among which are the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursu-
ing and obtaining happiness and safety." This motion was determined in the
negative.
Id. at 1151. Constitutional recognition that certain spheres are entirely outside the govern-
ment's jurisdiction could not be pushed that far.
372. Id. at 1149. This is not to claim that these rights are "absolute" in the sense that they
are infinite and possess no discernable defining boundaries. Clearly, they are not. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 348, at 792-94.
Congress may pass laws directed to other legitimate goals, which have an incidental im-
pact on speech, but are not directed to controlling speech or to punishing its content. United
State v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
To be meaningful, the phrase "freedom of speech" must be definable or, in other words,
limited. Significantly, the proposed amendment does not provide that "Congress shall make
no law abridging speech." Instead, the first amendment only withdraws legislative power to
abridge "the freedom of speech" which addresses a narrower concept than the notion of speech
itself. W. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 358, at 25. In providing that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech or of the press," the Framers certainly did not con-
ceive that any regulation affecting speech or the press would necessarily abridge the first
amendment guarantees.
Desecration statutes may be an example of regulation, still permissible after Texas v.
Johnson which has a mere incidental impact on speech or addresses less-protected speech, i.e.
commercial speech. 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2538 n.2, 2545 n.10 (1989). Similarly, reasonable regula-
tion of the "time, place and manner" of speech does not violate the first amendment, provided
the legislature's object is not to prohibit or punish communication of ideas it dislikes. See, e.g.,
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Sellers v. Regents of Univ. of California, 432
F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981 (1971). Breach of the peace with fighting
words, fraudulent misrepresentation, slander and obscenity, and incitement to riot, perhaps,
are more problematic, because liability turns upon the content of a communication. However,
the Supreme Court has conclusively held that such speech is not the speech protected under
the first amendment. Congress retains power to legislate in these limited spheres and within
the narrow bounds determined by the Supreme Court. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) (fighting words). Analysis of these matters is beyond the scope of this Article. A good
discussion of these issues can be found in W. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 358.
373. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 349, at 1147.
374. Id. at 1157-59.
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worth made the conference report to the Senate. 375 The conference con-
solidated the provisions disabling Congress from action directed toward
religion and the core political liberties, producing the language of the first
amendment.376
C. The Amendment Power Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's precedents do not foreclose an application of
the first amendment to limit Congress' power to make constitutional law.
The United States Supreme Court has twice rejected contentions that the
Bill of Rights places implicit limits on the procedure for adopting consti-
tutional amendments.377  In both cases the eighteenth amendment,
which established the national Prohibition, was challenged and up-
held.3 78 Neither case involved the express limitations imposed by the first
amendment, and neither gives any basis to now restrict the first
amendment.
In the National Prohibition Cases,3 79 the Supreme Court rejected a
challenge to the eighteenth amendment based on contentions that article
V amendment power is limited to "fine-tuning" the Constitution to cor-
rect errors or oversights.38 The eighteenth amendment, it was argued,
went beyond the bounds of the Constitution, in imposing the national
prohibition.381 One of the eminent attorneys advancing this view, Elihu
Root, argued:
Article V of the Constitution should not be construed to
confer unlimited legislative power upon the amending authori-
ties. . . . The framers undoubtedly regarded the power to
amend only as authorizing the inclusion of matter of the same
general character as the instrument or thing to be amended...
[T]he people can adopt any amendment to the Constitu-
tion they see fit. No doubt an amendment of any sort could be
adopted by the same means as were employed in the adoption
of the Constitution itself. In that manner alone do or can the
people themselves act .... The people could by appropriate
proceedings amend the Constitution so as to impair such vital
rights as freedom of religion, but it is inconceivable that any
375. Id. at 1159.
376. Id. at 1162.
377. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S.
350 (1920).
378. Sprague, 282 U.S. at 734; National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. at 386.
379. 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
380. Id. at 354.
381. Id. at 365.
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such unlimited power has been delegated to the amending
agents [Congress and the State legislatures], who may represent
but a minority of the people.382
The Supreme Court rejected contentions that article V amendment pow-
ers are generally limited to trivial corrections of the Constitutional
text.
383
In United States v. Sprague,384 another challenge to the eighteenth
amendment was struck down. 385 This time, the amendment's opponents
argued:
[T]he Tenth Amendment eliminates any possibility of power of
the legislatures to adopt amendments granting the national
government any additional powers over the people....
... If there were such unlimited powers in a few legisla-
tures they could override every one of the reserved rights cov-
ered by the first ten amendments; they could change the
government of limited powers into one of unlimited powers;
they could declare themselves hereditary rulers; they could
abolish religious freedom; they could abolish free speech and
even the right of the people to petition for redress; they could
not only abolish trial by jury, but even the right to a day in
court.
3 8 6
The tenth amendment, however, merely provides that the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states or to the people.387 The amend-
ment says nothing about whether Congress or the states can make any
laws to effect the prohibition.388 Thus, the Sprague Court held that the
tenth amendment "added nothing to the instrument as originally ratified
and has no limited and special operation, as is contended, upon the peo-
ple's delegation by article V of certain functions to the Congress. '389 On
the other hand, the first amendment is directed to the ability of Congress
and the states to make law, including constitutional law.
382. Id. at 363-64.
383. Id. at 386.
384. 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
385. Id. at 734.
386. Id. at 724-25.
387. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also Sprague, 282 U.S. at 733.
388. Sprague, 282 U.S. at 733.
389. Id. at 733-34.
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D. The Implications for Amending the Constitution in Convention
According to the Constitution's literal terms, an amendment which
limits the protection of the first amendment cannot become law based
upon approval of two-thirds of each House of Congress or ratification by
three-quarters of the state legislatures. Congress and the states, as legis-
lative bodies, under the Constitution, may simply lack the power to make
laws whose subject matter restricts the first amendment. The method for
adopting such an amendment may be limited to the fourth alternative
method provided in article V.390 It must be proposed by the people of the
United States, in constitutional convention, and adopted by the people in
constitutional conventions in three-fourths of the states.39
However, even the people assembled in a constitutional convention
may doubt the constitutional propriety of adopting an amendment to
abridge the freedom of speech protected by the first amendment. As Pro-
fessor Tribe wrote:
[In amending our Constitution, we] may choose to reject some
or all of its ideals, to override them, or to recast them, but as
long as we retain some commitment to the Constitution-as
long as we are amending it instead of discarding it-we cannot
simply ignore its fundamental norms. An amendment prohibit-
ing atheists from holding federal office, for example, would
clash with the current Constitution's paramount concern for
freedom of conscience no less than a statute to the same effect
would run counter to the current establishment clause.392
Thus, a proposal to restrict the first amendment's protections, even
in a noble gesture of respect for the flag, may violate fundamental consti-
tutional norms implied from the structure and literal interpretation of
the Constitution itself.39 3 However, the proposed amendment is not be-
yond the power of the people to adopt.
390. See supra note 337.
391. U.S. CONsT. art V. For a discussion of alternative means of amending the Constitu-
tion see supra notes 333-36 and accompanying text. The author concedes that it would be
unwise "to take the uncharted course of an Article V Convention while the well travelled route
of amendment by congressional initiative remains open." Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting
Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10
PAC. L.J. 627, 628 (1979) (emphasis added). However, only the article V convention route can
effect any amendment to limit the first amendment; the "well travelled route" is simply not
open.
392. L. TRIBE, supra note 340, at 439-40.
393. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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IX. CONCLUSION
The newly amended federal desecration statute may be unconstitu-
tionally vague and probably will not be constitutional when applied.
394
Thus, in order to protect the flag as Congress apparently desires, a con-
stitutional amendment must be proposed and ratified. However, the cur-
rently proposed constitutional amendment is poorly drafted and offers
little gain and presents great dangers. It may abridge constitutional lib-
erty for religion, 395 and speech,396 but it will not stop flag burning as
political protest.397
We could draft a new amendment or we could rely on the wisdom of
the Framers and leave the Constitution as it is. American revolutionaries
burned King George III and his ministers in effigy.3 98 They understood
the symbolic effect of such actions. During American revolutionary
times burning the symbols of British domination was a very powerful
political statement. Today, if an Iranian dissident is jailed for burning
either an effigy of the Ayatollah Khomeini, or the Islamic Republic's
flag, we would call him a political prisoner. If a Chinese student is jailed
for burning a communist flag in Tien An Men Square, we would again
protest that he is a political prisoner. If a subject of Soviet domination in
Eastern Europe is jailed for burning the Soviet flag we indignantly com-
plain that he is a political prisoner. If we pass the proposed amendment,
American government will also have a weapon against political
dissenters.
Under our Constitution and flag, however, American should be dif-
ferent. In Texas v. Johnson 399 Justice Brennan wrote, "Our decision is a
reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag
best reflects, and of the conviction that our tolerance of criticism... is a
sign and source of our strength.
40 0
394. See supra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 283-301 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 302-26 and accompanying text.
398. 3 M.N. ROTHBARD, CONCEIVED IN LIBERTY 30 (1976).
399. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
400. Id. at 2547.
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